Event-based prospective memory (PM) requires a deferred action to be performed when a target event is encountered in the future. Individuals are often slower to perform a concurrent ongoing task when they have PM task requirements relative to performing the ongoing task in isolation. Theories differ in their detailed interpretations of this PM cost, but all assume that the PM task shares limited-capacity resources with the ongoing task. In what was interpreted as support of this core assumption, diffusion model fits reported by Boywitt and Rummel (2012) and Horn, Bayen, and Smith (2011) indicated that PM demands reduced the rate of accumulation of evidence about ongoing task choices. We revaluate this support by fitting both the diffusion and linear ballistic accumulator (Brown & Heathcote, 2008 ) models to these same data sets and 2 new data sets better suited to model fitting. There was little effect of PM demands on evidence accumulation rates, but PM demands consistently increased the evidence required for ongoing task response selection (response thresholds). A further analysis of data reported by Lourenço, White, and Maylor (2013) found that participants differentially adjusted their response thresholds to slow responses associated with stimuli potentially containing PM targets. These findings are consistent with a delay theory account of costs, which contends that individuals slow ongoing task responses to allow more time for PM response selection to occur. Our results call for a fundamental reevaluation of current capacity-sharing theories of PM cost that until now have dominated the PM literature.
In our everyday lives we often need to remember to remember to remember, that is, to perform intended deferred actions when certain events or stimuli are encountered, a task referred to as event-based prospective memory (PM). For example, we may need to remember to buy wine on the way home from work when driving past the liquor store, post a letter when passing the post office, or to reduce speed when driving through a school zone (Gregory, Irwin, Faulks, & Chekaluk, 2014) . PM is highly relevant for everyday functioning, given that it has been estimated to be responsible for 50% to 80% of day to-day memory problems (Crovitz & Daniel, 1984; Kliegel & Martin, 2003) . The failure to perform intended actions can be disastrous in safety-critical work contexts such as aviation and medicine (Dismukes, 2012; Loft, 2014) . For example, PM failures by air traffic controllers have often contributed to the loss of safe separation between aircraft (Shorrock, 2005) , and many patients have suffered adverse consequences when medical personnel have failed to carry out intended actions (Gawande, Studdert, Orav, Brennan, & Zinner, 2003) . In addition, individuals from various clinical populations (e.g., affective disorders, schizophrenia, traumatic brain injury, Parkinson's disease, mild dementia, HIV) demonstrate quite severe event-based PM deficits that increase risk for negative everyday functioning outcomes, including medication nonadherence (Kliegel, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2008; Woods et al., 2008) .
Most experimental work on PM has used variants of the Einstein and McDaniel (1990) event-based PM laboratory paradigm. This paradigm typically requires participants to complete a twoalterative forced choice ongoing task (e.g., lexical decisions; press "F" for word, and "J" for nonword). At the outset of the ongoing task, some participants are instructed to remember to perform a third alternative response (e.g., press the "F1" key) if they are presented with a PM target event (e.g., a particular word, a particular syllable etc.). The defining feature of PM tasks is that, in contrast to retrospective memory or task-switching paradigms, there are no external requests from the experimenter, or requests from task instructions, that direct the participant when to engage in a memory search at the point that the PM task should be performed . Instead, PM tasks require individuals to self-initiate the recollection of intended actions in response to PM target events that are also appropriate stimulus events for more routine ongoing task responses (Loft & Remington, 2010; .
Current approaches to PM have primarily focused on the nature of the PM retrieval process-but have largely ignored any mechanistic account of how the PM task and ongoing task interact in processing. The Einstein and McDaniel (1990) paradigm places individuals in a difficult dual-task situation. They must set themselves to recognize and respond to a relatively rare PM target while performing a routine and often demanding ongoing task. Moreover, the PM target is very often a valid target in the ongoing task, as, for example, if "K" were the PM target in the context of a vowel-consonant discrimination. So, how can participants increase the likelihood of detecting the rare PM target without taking an unacceptably long time to make each ongoing task response? In principle, they can adopt any of three strategies that will improve their PM performance. They can shunt resources to the PM task, sharing limited-capacity processing resources between the two tasks. Capacity sharing will slow ongoing task reaction times (RTs) as increasing attention to the PM decision will slow the rate of information accrual for the ongoing task decision. Alternatively, they can adopt a cautious response policy by requiring more evidence before responding to the ongoing task stimulus. The rate at which information accrues will be unchanged, but ongoing task RT will be increased, increasing the time available to detect the PM target. Or, they can double-check their decision, withholding the ongoing task response even after response selection has completed, which would also produce costs to the ongoing task RT, without affecting either the rate of information accrual or the amount of information needed to select the ongoing task response. We show that the vast majority of costs are due to a cautious strategy, which involves elevating the response threshold for the ongoing task.
In contrast, all existing PM theories invoke capacity sharing assumptions in some form or other. When PM costs-as measured by a slowing in mean RT for correct ongoing task choices on non-PM trials-are observed, the unanimous inference has been that PM demands share limited-capacity resources with the ongoing task (e.g., Brewer, Knight, Marsh, & Unsworth, 2010; Cohen, Jaudas, & Gollwitzer, 2008; , 2010 Guynn, 2003; Loft & Humphreys, 2012; Loft & Yeo, 2007; Marsh, Hicks, Cook, Hansen, & Pallos, 2003; Scullin, McDaniel, & Shelton, 2013; Smith, 2003 Smith, , 2010 Smith & Bayen, 2004) . Moreover, as reviewed in the sections below, all current theories of PM costs explicitly assume that PM task demands drain capacity from the ongoing task, such that individuals perform the ongoing task less efficiently when a concurrent PM task demand is active. Horn et al. (2011) and Boywitt and Rummel (2012) bolstered this conclusion with analyses applying the Ratcliff diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998 ; specifically the version of Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 2002 , as implemented by Voss & Voss, 2007) , which provides a comprehensive account of behavior encompassing both accuracy and the full distribution of RT for all choices.
We show these diffusion-model analyses to be problematic, and in two new data sets better suited to this type of model fitting we find only weak support for capacity-sharing theories of PM cost. In contrast, there was strong evidence that participants slowed their responding in order to remember to remember by increasing their response thresholds (i.e., by requiring more evidence to make each ongoing task decision). We show this conclusion generalizes beyond the diffusion model to an alternative evidence accumulation model, the linear ballistic accumulator (LBA; Brown & Heathcote, 2008) . These findings are consistent with a delay theory account of PM costs, which contends that decision thresholds for the ongoing task are elevated allowing more time for PM response selection to occur before the ongoing task response is selected. We also show that the delay theory account naturally extends to the stimulusspecific PM costs reported by Lourenço, White, and Maylor (2013) through adjustments in response bias, which trades a higher response threshold for PM-associated ongoing task stimuli with a lower response threshold for stimuli not potentially containing PM targets. We argue that this slowing targeted at PM-associated responses provides a mechanism for improving PM target detection.
Theories of Prospective Memory
There are two main theories proposed to account for how individuals remember to perform intended actions. The preparatory attentional and memory (PAM) processes theory claims that PM retrieval requires the allocation of capacity consuming "preparatory attentional processes" (Smith, 2003 (Smith, , 2010 Smith & Bayen, 2004; Smith, Hunt, McVay, & McConnell, 2007) . PAM theory contends that these preparatory attentional processes allow the individual to be prepared to recognize an opportunity to execute the PM task, with the subsequent recognition of PM target events involving processes similar to those involved in retrospective memory tasks. In contrast, the multiprocess view of PM asserts that under some task conditions, such as when PM targets are salient or when the ongoing task directs attention to the features of PM targets processed at encoding ("focal targets"), PM retrieval can be spontaneous, without the need for preceding cognitive resource allocation McDaniel, Guynn, Einstein, & Breneiser, 2004) . Under other conditions, such as when the defining features of the PM cues are not part of the information being extracted in the service of the ongoing task ("nonfocal targets"), the multiprocess view assumes that PM retrieval relies on capacity-consuming attentional resources being devoted to the PM task.
Although the nature of spontaneous retrieval processes has been further differentiated-for example, in terms of reflexive-associative processes and discrepancy-plus-search processes (Breneiser & McDaniel, 2006; )-comparatively little is known about how individuals detect PM target events in task contexts not supported by spontaneous retrieval. It is crucial to understand these detection processes for designing interventions which improve PM in everyday and work settings (Dismukes, 2012; Gregory et al., 2014; Loft, 2014; Loft, Finnerty, & Remington, 2011; Loft & Remington, 2010) , in various clinical populations (for review see Kliegel, McDaniel, et al., 2008) , and in the normal ageing population (Ihle, Hering, Mahy, Bisiacchi, & Kliegel, 2013; Kliegel, Jäger, & Phillips, 2008) .
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task demand. A very large number of studies have demonstrated that RT for ongoing task trials are slower when participants have concurrent PM tasks (a PM condition) compared with when participants perform the ongoing task alone (a control condition) (a small selection of such studies include; Brewer et al., 2010; Guynn, 2003; Loft & Humphreys, 2012; Loft, Kearney, & Remington, 2008; Marsh et al., 2003; Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004; ; for a review see Smith et al., 2007) . Costs have been observed irrespective of whether the control versus PM manipulation occurs within or between subjects. These costs are measured on nontarget trials (i.e., trials not requiring a PM response), and so do not reflect a cost associated with actually carrying out the PM action. Theories of PM differ in their interpretations of how these costs track various cognitive processes. The PAM theory argues that costs reflect preparatory attentional processes whose function is to "promote the recognition of a given event as a target for an intended action in addition to or instead of whatever other interpretation is placed on perception of that event" (Smith et al., 2007, p. 742) . PAM further specifies that preparatory attention can include explicit "monitoring" for targets. Guynn's (2003) twoprocess model of strategic monitoring claims that participants instantiate a PM "retrieval mode," in which the intention-deferred action is maintained in an active state, which can be supplemented with explicit "checking" for targets. Similarly, the multiprocess view (MPV) claims that costs reflect participants 'monitoring' for targets (e.g., through an "attention allocation policy" that individuals establish at encoding and which divides a limited pool of cognitive resources between the ongoing task and the PM task according to the perceived importance and difficulty of the PM demands.
The aforementioned theories are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive explanations for costs. However, they all attribute ongoing task costs to the sharing of limited-capacity resources during stimulus processing. As a result they predict that the information-processing load embodied in the PM component of the task will have a direct effect on the efficiency of information processing related to the ongoing task; diverting limited capacity resources to the PM task will slow the evidence accumulation rate for the ongoing task. The capacity-sharing account has also been extended to PM tasks in applied work contexts (Dismukes, 2012; Loft, 2014; Loft, Finnerty, et al., 2011; Loft & Remington, 2010; Loft, Smith, & Bhaskara, 2011; Loft, Smith, & Remington, 2013) , as well as to individuals in clinical populations (Kliegel, McDaniel et al., 2008) . Moreover, it is frequently argued that certain clinical populations have PM deficits because they lack the prefrontal executive control required to strategically divide limited-capacity attentional resources between competing ongoing task and PM task demands (e.g., Costa, Carlesimo, & Caltagirone, 2012; Altgassen, Kliegel, & Martin, 2009; Chen, Zhou, Cui, & Chen, 2013; Li, Loft, Weinborn, & Maybery, 2014; Pavawalla, SchmitterEdgecombe, & Smith, 2012) . In addition, more general taxonomies about the cognitive origins of errors and the types of errors that occur at different levels of skilled performance in everyday work and leisure activities assume that individuals can forget to perform intended actions because they fail to perform "attentional checks" of the task environment when deviation from a routine task is required (Norman, 1981; Reason, 1990; Senders & Moray, 1991) .
Delay Theory and Evidence Accumulation Models
In event-based PM paradigms, the target for the PM task is typically drawn from the set of stimuli used in the ongoing task, and is therefore an appropriate stimulus for the ongoing task response. In addition, participants are typically instructed to make rapid ongoing task responses. Thus, not only must the participant remember a new episodic task, but the PM task must compete for response selection with the more routine ongoing task (Dismukes, 2012; Loft & Remington, 2010 ). Based on this task analysis, recently proposed an alternative account of PM that was inspired by mathematical models of cognitive choice which assume that task decisions are made by the accumulation of evidence (e.g., Brown & Heathcote, 2005; Kamienkowski, Pashler, Dehaene, & Sigman, 2011; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004) . Loft and Remington suggested that ongoing task responses and PM task responses compete in a race for response selection. That is, individuals make task response selections by accumulating information (evidence) about the ongoing task and PM task, and make a task response when evidence favoring a particular response exceeds a response threshold. This is a significant departure from current thinking because this account views PM errors not as a failure of memory but as a failure induced by the differences in relative processing efficiencies of the ongoing and PM tasks. This conceptualization of PM predicted that PM task errors should be reduced if participants were provided more processing time. Loft and Remington delayed participant ongoing task responses by presenting a tone at varying onsets (0 ms-1,600 ms) following stimulus presentation that indicated when participants were allowed to make a task response. Improvements in PM were observed at response delays as brief as 0.2 s. Furthermore, nonfocal PM accuracy was statistically comparable with focal PM accuracy at response delays of as little as 0.6 s.
This finding raises the possibility that individuals may endogenously implement something akin to the response-delay manipulation by setting higher ongoing task response thresholds that slow ongoing task responses to allow more time for PM response selection to occur. The fact that participants are typically instructed to make rapid ongoing task responses means that PM retrieval could be preempted by the more routine and often faster ongoing task response. Although it is conceivable that PM actions may be retrieved during the "down time" before the next trial, or during the next trial itself, late PM responses are rare even when participants are instructed that late PM responses can be made (e.g., McDaniel, Shelton, Breneiser, Moynan, & Balota, 2011; Taylor, Marsh, Hicks, & Hancock, 2004) . The fact that allowable late PM responses are rare suggests it is likely critical that PM response selection is made before ongoing task response selection. It would then make sense for participants to set a higher threshold, which would slow selection of the ongoing task response and allow more time for the PM response to reach its threshold. In the current paper we refer to this account of PM costs as the delay theory. A key assumption of delay theory is that although human cognitive capacity is undoubtedly limited, costs to ongoing tasks need not represent a sharing of capacity between the This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. ongoing task and PM task during stimulus processing, but can also arise from increasing the amount of evidence accumulated. The Loft and Remington findings are consistent with delay theory, but are not conclusive. Their experimental design could not rule out that their longer response delays allowed more attentional capacity to be devoted to the PM task once ongoing task processing had been completed (i.e., a serial processing approach). In the current article we provide more direct evidence for the delay theory account of costs in event-based PM. The implication of our findings, elaborated further in the General Discussion, is that capacity sharing as advocated by both PAM theory and the multiprocess view is not the major cause of PM costs; a conclusion that is at odds with all current theoretical accounts of PM-induced cost. We begin by reviewing recent work that has applied evidence accumulation models to PM costs. Horn et al. (2011) fit the Ratcliff diffusion (RD) model to data from Smith's (2003) seminal demonstration of PM costs in an ongoing lexical-decision task. The RD model is one example of the general class of evidence accumulation models (e.g., Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Usher & McClelland, 2001 ), all of which assume that choices are made by accumulating information about different potential responses. A response is triggered when sufficient evidence favoring a particular choice is accumulated. Errors can occur because evidence is noisy, but participants can reduce the error rate by setting higher threshold (i.e., requiring a larger total amount of evidence before making a decision). However, it takes longer to accrue more evidence, and so threshold adjustment results in a speed-accuracy trade-off. Ratcliff, Gomez, and McKoon (2004) applied the RD model to lexical-decision task data, and concluded that it provided an accurate account of both response accuracy and the distribution of RT for both correct and error responses. The effects of different types of words and nonwords were accounted for by differences in the mean rate at which evidence accumulated. Horn et al. (2011) reported a best-fitting RD model with both lower mean evidence accumulation rates and higher response thresholds in PM conditions compared to control conditions (i.e., lexical decision only). Boywitt and Rummel (2012) fit a RD model to data that used an ongoing color-matching task. They contrasted performance in a control condition to performance in conditions that had either less or more demanding PM tasks. Not only were the mean rate lower and the response threshold higher in the demanding PM condition relative to the other two conditions, but also there were longer nondecision times (i.e., the time required to complete processes other than response selection such as stimulus encoding and response production). Horn et al. (2011) and Boywitt and Rummel (2012) concludedconsistent with the fundamental assumption of current theories of PM-that the lower mean evidence accumulation rates indicated that PM demands caused limited-capacity resources to be diverted from the ongoing task, slowing its evidence accumulation rate. This association between capacity and evidence accumulation rate made by Horn et al. (2011) and Boywitt and Rummel (2012) is supported by a recent demonstration by Eidels, Donkin, Brown, and Heathcote (2010) that capacity characterized by LBA rate parameters agreed with the rigorous and widely applied nonparametric capacity estimates provided by Systems Factorial Technology (Townsend & Nozawa, 1995 , see Townsend & Altieri, 2012 , for a recent summary and extension). Accumulation rates have also been used in other domains to test the idea of capacity sharing, such as by Logan, Van Zandt, Verbruggen, and Wagenmakers (2014) in the stop-signal paradigm in relation to capacity shared by stop and choice processes. In addition, drift rates have been found to be larger for individuals with higher working memory capacity (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2012; Schmiedek, Oberauer, Wilhelm, Süss, & Wittmann, 2007) .
The findings of Horn et al. (2011) and Boywitt and Rummel (2012) that part of the observed costs were due to a speedaccuracy trade-off, with more cautious responding under PM conditions, is consistent with the assumption of our delay theory that individuals strategically set higher ongoing task response thresholds in order to slow ongoing task responses and allow more time for time for PM response selection. In line with this interpretation, there is a large body of evidence that experimental factors that potentially change perceived task demands, such as variations in speed-accuracy instructions, expectancies of events, and rewards, map onto parameters sensitive to the amount of evidence needed to reach decision threshold, by either altering the starting point or threshold parameters (e.g., Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Mulder, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Boekel, & Forstmann, 2012; Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon, 2008; Voss, Rothermund, & Voss, 2004) .
The findings of Horn et al. (2011) and Boywitt and Rummel (2012) would suggest that both evidence accumulation rates (capacity-theory) and threshold settings (delay theory) underlie costs in PM conditions. These studies also found larger values for the nondecision time parameter. Boywitt and Rummel (2012) concluded that an increase in nondecision time could reflect a delay caused by checking for the PM target after the ongoing task response selection has been made but before the ongoing task response has been executed (Guynn, 2003) . Another plausible interpretation of the nondecision time effect is that reduced capacity under PM conditions slows encoding of the aspects of the stimulus relevant to the ongoing task, or even response production. Note, however, that encoding and response production are widely thought not to rely on shared limited-capacity resources, and be unaffected by the division of such resources (see, e.g., Pashler, 1994) . In addition, it is important to note that the increase in nondecision time could also be due to strategic slowing of stimulus encoding or response production, rather than a result of checking or reduced capacity. For example, it is easy to imagine that participants would reduce the urgency with which they produce responses so that the associated delay decreases the chance of an ongoing task response preempting a PM response. Thus, we argue that, although rates can be unambiguously linked to capacitysharing theory, and more cautious responding unambiguously linked to delay theory, the implications of a delay in nondecision time are fundamentally ambiguous with respect to discriminating between delay theory and capacity-sharing theories of PM costs.
Previously Reported Model-Based Evidence
The analyses reported by Horn et al. (2011) and Boywitt and Rummel (2012) illustrate the methodological advantages and theoretical insights that can be gained by fitting evidence accumulation models. However, we think there are both empirical and theoretical grounds requiring the existing model-based evidence regarding the causes of PM costs to be reevaluated. First, we believe there is reason to doubt whether Horn et al.'s (2011) and Boywitt and Rummel's (2012) 
model fits adequately described
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performance in their experiments. Previous model-based analyses of the task used by Horn et al., the lexical-decision task (e.g., Heathcote & Hayes, 2012; Heathcote & Love, 2012; Wagenmakers et al., 2008) , have found differences in mean rates for words and nonwords, as well as differences in response bias (i.e., word responses require less evidence to be accumulated than nonword responses). Horn et al. fit a restricted version of the RD model with unbiased responding and equal absolute mean rates for words and nonwords, but report no results that justify these restrictions. Similarly, Boywitt and Rummel assumed unbiased responding and equal rates for different stimuli in their ongoing color-matching task with no justification. Boywitt and Rummel do report evidence for differential practice effects associated with a response-caution manipulation, but did not account for practice effects in their model. Both sets of authors supplied us with their data and in a reanalysis-reported in detail in supplementary material and summarized after we report the results of our first experiment-we found that significant practice effects were indeed present in both sets of experiments. Aggregation over nuisance effects such as practice is problematic because evidence-accumulation model fits are sensitive not only to the data's location statistics (e.g., accuracy or mean RT) but also to other aspects of the distribution of data, such as its variability. In standard linear ANOVA analyses nuisance effects such as practice and fatigue can be ignored (i.e., data can be aggregated over trials) without confounding, as long as it can be safely assumed that the nuisance factors have balanced effects on the factors of interest. However, aggregation over nuisance effects-if they are of sufficient magnitude-can inflate variance or otherwise affect the distribution of data in a way that can distort estimates of evidence-accumulation model parameters. This distortion can lead to a spuriously poor fit that might cause a model to be wrongly rejected. That is, it can lead to rejection of a model that can provide a good description of the unaggregated data by allowing parameters to vary to accommodate the nuisance effect.
Even when a model provides a good fit to the aggregated data, its parameter estimates, and hence psychological inferences based on these estimates, can be distorted by ignoring nuisance effects. Model parameters corresponding to different psychological processes can be differentially sensitive to variance inflation caused by aggregation, so real effects on parameters can be masked or spurious effects created. The same considerations apply to aggregation over nuisance effects other than practice, such as response bias or stimulus type effects. Our reanalysis attempted to discover any substantial nuisance effects in Horn et al.'s (2011) and Boywitt and Rummel's (2012) data. We then addressed these problems in new fits of the RD model, either by allowing parameters to vary to capture the effect, or in the case of practice effects, by performing subsidiary analyses on subsets of trials where performance was relatively stable.
A second empirical problem concerns the use of easy ongoing tasks, which results in highly accurate responding. An increase in threshold in response to the addition of a PM task would be expected to both increase RT and increase accuracy for the ongoing-task. In practice, this predicted effect on accuracy would be hard to detect because ongoing task performance is usually close to the ceiling. This was the case in Smith's (2003) data and in Boywitt and Rummel's (2012) data; in fact, near ceiling ongoing task accuracy (Ͼ 95%) that is not significantly affected by PM demands is almost pervasive in PM research, having been reported with ongoing lexical decision (e.g., Brandimonte, Ferrante, Feresin, & Delbello, 2001; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen, Jaudas, Hirschhorn, Sobin, & Gollwitzer, 2012; Harrison & Einstein, 2010; Loft & Humphreys, 2012; Loft & Yeo, 2007; Marsh et al., 2003 Marsh et al., , 2005 Meeks & Marsh, 2010; Meeks, Hicks, & Marsh, 2007; Scullin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2010; Scullin, McDaniel, Shelton, & Lee, 2010; Smith, 2003 Smith, , 2010 Smith et al., 2007) and categorization Foster, McDaniel, Repovs, & Hershey, 2009; McDaniel et al., 2011) tasks. Research using color matching ongoing tasks has also reported accuracy levels between 85% and 92% that are not significantly affected by PM task demands (e.g., Boywitt & Rummel, 2012; Pavawalla, SchmitterEdgecombe, & Smith, 2012; Smith & Bayen, 2004; Smith et al., 2007; Smith, Horn, & Bayen, 2012; Smith, McConnell-Rogers, McVay, Lopez, & Loft, 2014 ; but see Smith & Bayen, 2006 , for an exception).
A lack of errors is often taken as justifying an exclusive focus on RT. This justification is questionable, because it is exactly when accuracy is high that small and difficult to detect changes in error rates have their largest effect on RT. More importantly in the current context, high accuracy makes it difficult to interpret parameter estimates from evidence accumulation models. Because these models provide a complete account of behavior, including the speed of error responses, if few errors are observed there is little constraint on estimates of parameters related to the speed of error responses. These underconstrained parameters can then trade-off with other parameters, resulting in highly variable estimates that do not properly represent the underlying psychological processes even though the model provides an accurate fit to the data. As we describe in detail below, we report two new experiments designed to have some more difficult ongoing-task conditions. This allows us to measure error-related behavior with sufficient precision to better constrain evidence-accumulation model parameter estimates.
The problems attending low error rates are an example of "over fitting," that is, accounting for data with an overly complex model (i.e., a model that can account for errors when few are observed). Even when error rates are higher over fitting can occur if a model contains parameters that are superfluous given the underlying causes of differences in behavior. In a RD model, for example, suppose that PM and control conditions differ because evidence accrues more quickly in the control condition, resulting in faster and more accurate responding than in the PM condition. Now suppose a model is fit that allows all model parameters to vary between the two conditions. Estimating a higher evidence threshold in the control condition could account for greater accuracy. This would also slow responding, but that tendency could be reversed if nondecision time were smaller in the control than PM condition. Alternatively, suppose the PM condition differs because it truly has a higher response threshold than the control condition, resulting in slower and more accurate responding. This could be mimicked by a longer nondecision time and a faster rate in the PM than control condition. Many other, and often subtler, parameter trade-offs are possible in realistically complex evidence accumulation models that allow for processes such as response bias and parameter variability from trial to trial. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
The only remedy we are aware of for these trade-offs is to compare the performance of many different model variants (i.e., models that restrict the freedom of parameters to vary over conditions in different ways). Horn et al. (2011) and Boywitt and Rummel (2012) , in contrast, fit only one variant. This variant was highly flexible in some ways, as it was fit separately to each PM condition and so PM cost could be accounted for in multiple ways. In other ways, as we have just outlined, it was overly restrictive, failing to account for well-known effects of factors other than PM. Our approach was to fit not only a very flexible model that allowed for all of these effects, but also many different variants of that "top" model that equated parameters over conditions in different ways. We then used a variety of approaches, described in detail below, to select among these models. We focus on verbal and graphical summaries of these different approaches in the body of the article, with detailed analysis results presented in an appendix and supporting subsidiary analyses in supplementary materials.
On the theoretical front, Horn et al. 's (2011) and Boywitt and Rummel's (2012) psychological conclusions rest heavily on assuming the truth of a particular evidence accumulation model. Their use of the RD model is reasonable given it is the most widely applied and successful example of the class of diffusion-based evidence accumulation models, which assume that binary choices are mediated by a single process that accumulates differences between evidence favoring each response. Another widely applied class of evidence accumulation models assume separate processes corresponding to each response. Examples of this class of models, such as the leaky-competitive accumulator (Usher & McClelland, 2001 ) and the LBA (Brown & Heathcote, 2008) , have been shown to provide an account of choice behavior equally comprehensive as that provided by the RD model. Although the RD and LBA models have been shown to often lead to the same theoretical conclusions (Donkin, Brown, Heathcote, & Wagenmakers, 2011) this is not always the case (Heathcote & Hayes, 2012) . Hence, we believe it is important to fit at least one exemplar of each class of model.
Because accumulator models allow different and potentially independent inputs to each accumulator they can provide a more nuanced characterization of effects on the rate of evidence accumulation (Heathcote & Love, 2012) . This characterization differentiates between: (a) the overall level of the rates for all accumulators, which corresponds to the total capacity available for information processing and which has its strongest effect on overall response speed; and (b) the difference in the rates for each accumulator, which corresponds to the quality of discriminative information extracted from the stimulus (analogous to the drift rate in the RD model) and which has its strongest effect on response accuracy. This flexibility means that theoretical conclusions about effects on capacity might differ between accumulator and diffusion models. also found that spurious changes in nondecision time could occur in fits of the RD model to data simulated from the LBA model due to manipulations of the LBA threshold parameter. Conversely a manipulation of the RD model's threshold parameter caused spurious changes in LBA rate estimates. In light of the potential for these spurious effects involving changes in threshold parameters, and the strong possibility that PM manipulations affect the threshold, we thought it prudent to examine both diffusion (RD) and accumulator (LBA) fits to our data, and to Horn et al.'s (2011) and Boywitt and Rummel's (2012) data.
Finally, rather than interpreting model-based results only in the light of the currently dominant capacity-sharing theories of PM, we also consider the delay theory account. In agreement with Horn et al. (2011) and Boywitt and Rummel (2012) we argue that PM effects on rate parameters clearly support the capacity-sharing theory. We also argue that effects on response thresholds support the delay theory, whereas effects on nondecision time are ambiguous and could provide support for either theory. Our overall position is that both capacity sharing and delay theories may simultaneously have a role in explaining PM costs. Hence, rather than attempting to an all-or-none selection of one theory or the other we seek to determine their relative importance. In particular, where there is evidence for a PM effect on more than one of the three types of parameters we develop quantitative indicators of what proportion of the PM cost is attributable to each.
Experiment 1
Because differences in ongoing-task accuracy help to differentiate threshold and rate effects, we ran an experiment using a stimulus manipulation that had a large effect on accuracy by having participants perform an ongoing lexical-decision task that included both high-frequency (i.e., common) and more difficult low-frequency words. We examined speed-accuracy trade-off using both model-based analyses and conventional ANOVA analyses on nontarget trial error rates and nontarget trial mean RT for correct responses. The two analyses complement each other, allowing us to check whether and how effects identified in the conventional analyses are reflected in model parameters. The word-frequency manipulation also allowed us to benchmark our results against other model-based investigations of the lexicaldecision task, which have shown word frequency effects on evidence accumulation rates (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; . The PM task required participants to remember to press an alternative response key if letter strings were presented in a particular color. Because determining the color of letter strings is not necessary to make lexical decisions, this PM task is nonfocal. This type of PM task is, therefore, predicted by all capacitysharing theories of PM, including PAM theory and the multiprocess view, to lead to costs for the ongoing task.
In contrast to the designs analyzed by Horn et al. (2011) and Boywitt and Rummel (2012) , our experiment used a withinsubjects PM manipulation. Each participant performed separate blocks; one block with the ongoing task alone (the control condition) and one block with concurrent ongoing and PM tasks (PM condition), with block order counterbalanced over participants. Einstein and McDaniel (2010) identified a number of advantages of this within-subjects design. We adopted it not only because of the advantages it offers in statistical power, both in conventional and model-based analyses, but also because it allowed us to apply model-selection techniques (Myung & Pitt, 1997) to our fits to each participant's data. These techniques select a model for each participant that provides the best trade-off between goodness-of-fit and model simplicity, giving the selected model improved predictive validity (i.e., ability to generalize to new data). Importantly, we show that parameter estimates for more parsimonious models selected by these techniques can also have quite different psychological implications from those implied by the parameter estimates of more complex models. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Smith (2010) raised concerns about the effects of practice and fatigue on interpreting costs in a within-subjects design, and preferred instead a between-subjects design. Einstein and McDaniel (2010) pointed out that counterbalancing provides a widely accepted method of dealing with this concern in relation to cost measures averaged over participants. We adopted a counterbalanced design, but rather than simply averaging over order effects we incorporated a block-order factor into our analyses. This afforded us an opportunity to examine whether participants adopted different strategies for completing the ongoing task depending on whether they encountered the PM block first or second in the experiment. Given threshold effects-which are inherently strategic in nature-appear likely in the PM paradigm according to delay theory, it is plausible that response threshold effects might mediate potential order effects.
Method
Participants. Forty-eight undergraduates participated in return for course credit. Participants were tested individually with an equal number randomly allocated to PM-block first and controlblock first conditions. One participant's data was excluded because their accuracy was at chance in the lexical-decision task, leaving 24 participants in the PM-first condition and 23 participants in the control-first condition.
Stimuli. We presented stimuli and collected responses using E-prime (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) . A pool of 220 high frequency (HF) words (150 ϩ occurrences per million) and 220 low frequency (LF) words (three occurrences per million) were randomly selected from the 1994 issues of the Sydney Morning Herald word database (Dennis, 1995) . Of these, 110 HF words and 110 LF words were used as word stimuli. The remaining 220 (110 HF and 110 LF) words were converted to nonwords (NW) by replacing every vowel in each word with a randomly chosen alternate vowel (e.g., chemist to chamust).
Two sets of experimental stimuli were created, Set A and Set B. Each set contained 55 HF words, 55 LF words, and 110 nonwords. Each participant performed a control block (lexical decision only) and a PM block (lexical decision and PM). The assignments of condition and set were counterbalanced such that each participant received one of the following schedules; Control (Set A) then PM (Set B), Control (Set B) then PM (Set A), PM (Set A) then Control (Set B), or PM (Set B) then Control (Set A). The order of presentation of words and nonwords within each set was random, except for the presentation of PM targets. In PM blocks, one target was presented at a random location in each of the following trial sequences: 5-24, 30 -49, 55-74, 80 -99, 105-124, 130 -149,155-174, 180 -199, and 205-219 . For each participant, six target trials were word stimuli (three LF and three HF) and three NW stimuli. The assignment of stimuli types (HF, LF, or NW) to trial sequence was counterbalanced across participants. Selection from the available sets of HF, LF, and NW stimuli for target trials was random. On PM blocks, the lexical decision stimuli were presented in one of five colors (green, pink, red, white, yellow) . Target stimuli were presented in one of these colors, and nontarget stimuli were presented in the four remaining colors. The color used for the target trials was approximately counterbalanced across participants. In the control block, stimuli were presented in the four nontarget colors (i.e., the PM color was not presented during the control block). The assignment of the four colors to nontarget trials in the control block, and the PM block, was random. An additional 16 HF words and 16 LF words were selected to serve as stimuli in the practice phase of the experiment. Half of these were converted to nonwords. Eight HF words, eight LF words, and 16 NW stimuli were randomly presented in the practice phase (the PM target color was not presented during the practice phase).
Procedure. For lexical decisions participants were instructed to decide if letter strings were English words or nonwords and to respond by pressing "f" for a word or "j" for a nonword. Participants were told to make lexical decisions as quickly and accurately as possible. Trials began with a fixation cross "ϩ," displayed in blue on a black background for 0.5 s. The fixation cross was then replaced by a blank screen for 0.25 s, followed by the presentation of the colored letter string which remained on the black screen until the participant made a response. If the participant made an incorrect lexical decision the word "incorrect" was presented in blue for 1 s. Participants in PM conditions were additionally instructed to press the "F1" key when presented with a letter string in the target color during the ongoing lexicaldecision task. Participants first completed 32 practice lexical decision trials and received feedback on both the accuracy and speed of their ongoing-task responses. Participants then either completed the control block followed by the PM block, or vice versa. After receiving instructions for the control block, participants completed a 3-min distracter puzzle before beginning the lexical decisions. Participants also completed the 3-min distracter puzzle after receiving instructions for the PM block.
Results
PM responses were scored correct if participants pressed the F1 key on the target trial. On average participants correctly responded to 52% of PM targets. Participants rarely made PM false alarms, on average 0.4%; 34 of the 47 participants made no PM false alarms and the remainder only made 0.5%-3.8%.
In our analysis of the ongoing task we removed from PM blocks all PM and PM false alarm trials along with the subsequent two trials for each. We also removed trials with an RT greater than three standard deviations above the mean for each participant (1.8%) or responses made in less than 0.3 s (0.1%). We examined the effect of practice within blocks by creating a factor dividing trials occurring in the first and second half of each block. In an appendix we report p Ͻ .05 significant effects on mean RT for correct responses and error rates in mixed ANOVAs using our main design factors, stimulus type (HF, LF, and NW), block type (PM vs. control), block order (Control first vs. PM first) and block half (1st vs. 2nd). Here, we summarize these analyses with average results in terms of error rates and mean RT for correct trials displayed in Figure 1 .
As expected, responding was faster and less error prone for high-frequency words than low-frequency words (by 0.12 s and 23%, respectively), with nonwords falling in between (0.025 s faster and 6% more accurate than low-frequency words). The pattern of PM effects is suggestive of a speed-accuracy trade-off associated with the PM block when it occurred first, as indicated by a 2% lower error rate and 0.055 s slower correct responses. When the control block was presented first, responses in the PM This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
block were still slower, but by a lesser amount (0.035 s), and the difference in accuracy was negligible. Practice effects within blocks, as indexed by the main effect of 1st versus 2nd block half, were small (0.012 s faster and 0.2% more errors in the 2nd block) and nonsignificant. We also examined the difference between correct and error response speed, which has proven important in constraining evidence accumulation models (e.g., Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998) . The only significant difference occurred for nonwords in the PM block, where errors were significantly slower by 0.075 s (there was a similar trend in the control block, 0.2 s, but it was not significant).
Discussion
Our results are suggestive of the possibility that participants were more cautious (i.e., adopted a higher response threshold) when they encountered the PM block first, as they responded both more slowly and more accurately. In contrast, our finding of slowing without an accuracy increase when the control block was presented first suggests that some other factor not affecting accuracy might be responsible for the smaller PM cost in this case. Alternately there may have been a trade-off between two or more factors affecting both accuracy and RT (e.g., criteria and mean rates) that balanced out in accuracy but not in RT. We test these different explanations using the model-based analysis in the next section.
Past research has reported lexical decision practice effects between blocks when using medium frequency words intermixed with nonwords (e.g., Smith et al., 2007) . However, we did not find any consistent effect of trials within blocks indicative of substantial practice or fatigue effects, probably because our lexical-decision task was more difficult. We concluded that it is safe to aggregate data from a block when fitting models. It remains possible that some of the effects we observed on block order are due to practice or fatigue (Smith, 2010) , although this Figure 1 . Experiment 1 mean reaction time (RT) for correct responses and error rates for each stimulus type (PM ϭ prospective memory; HF ϭ high frequency words, LF ϭ low frequency words and NW ϭ nonwords) and block order. Data are plotted with within-subject error bars using Morey's (2008) bias-corrected method. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
possibility seems unlikely given the small within-block effects.
Even so, our model-based analysis allows parameters to vary between the first and second block as a function of block type, parameter estimates are not subject to the distortions due to practice or fatigue effects between blocks. Typically error responses are slower than correct responses when participants are trying to respond carefully and accurately, whereas when speed is emphasized errors can be as fast or faster than correct responses. In the RD model within-trial fluctuations in evidence are the main cause of errors and variability in RT. However, the RD model cannot accommodate differences between error and correct RT unless it also includes trial-to-trial variability in the starting point and mean rate of evidence accumulation, because without these it predicts equal correct and error RT. Trial-to-trial rate variability causes slower error than correct responses, and start-point variability the opposite pattern.
Differences in the relative effects of each type of trial-to-trial variability enables the RD model to fit complex and systematic effects of experimental manipulations on the relative speed of error and correct responses (e.g., Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998) . The same is true of the LBA model, where these two types of trial-to-trial fluctuations are the sole cause of both errors and variability in RT (Brown & Heathcote, 2008) . Also, in both models correct responses gain in speed relative to error responses when there is a bias toward the correct response. Hence, both models predict that the likely cause of our finding of slower error responses than correct responses for nonwords, but little difference for words, is a combination of careful responding where trial-to-trial rate variability dominates start-point variability and word-biased responding. The model fits reported in the next section provide a quantitative test of this assertion.
Model Analysis
Separate model fits to each participant's data were obtained using the QMPE method, which approximates multinomial maximum likelihood estimation (Heathcote, Brown, & Mewhort, 2002; Heathcote & Brown, 2004) . QMPE is also approximately equivalent to the 2 method commonly used with the RD model (Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 2002) . We preferred QMPE over the methods used by Horn et al. (2011) and Boywitt and Rummel's (2012) , both of whom employed the fast-dm package (Voss & Voss, 2007) , as van Ravenzwaaij and Oberauer (2009) found that QMPE was more capable than fast-dm of recovering experimental effects on parameters (but see Lerche & Voss, 2013) .
Following standard practice (Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 2002) , we report fits of the RD model to the 10th, 30th, 50th (i.e., median), 70th, and 90th RT percentiles of correct and error responses. Where less than nine observations were available in a design cell a subset of the percentiles was used: just the 50th for less than four observations, and 30th, 50th and 70th, percentiles for four to eight observations. We also fit the LBA model to these quantiles using QMPE. In contrast to the RD model, the more mathematically tractable LBA model can also be fit by maximum likelihood methods to raw data without requiring quantile-based summaries. Results from the two methods led to the same conclusions; we report the QMPE results as they allow us to directly compare goodness-of-fit between the two models.
We used the optimization (parameter search) methodology described in to obtain fits, first fitting simple models with fewer parameters, and then using the best fitting parameters for the simpler models as starting points in searching for the best fitting parameters of more complicated models. This method requires considerable computational effort (e.g., the RD results we report required 240,687 fits and the LBA results 48,175 fits). However, this effort can be necessary to obtain good fits when models have a large number of estimated parameters, because as the number of parameters increases so does the risk of obtaining suboptimal fits due to trade-offs between parameters. It also enables a thorough selection process among different model parameterizations (i.e., different possibilities for selective influence of experimental manipulations on different types of model parameters).
We report goodness-of-fit using the multinomial deviance (D) measure that is minimized by QMPE. Smaller deviance values indicate a better fit, with differences in deviance between nested models having a 2 distribution. We do not attempt to interpret deviance as a measure of absolute fit, as we do not believe this provides useful information. When significant, absolute measures of fit may merely indicate abundant power, and nonsignificance cannot be interpreted without making the mistake of accepting a null hypothesis. Although a power analysis might ameliorate these problems we know of no easy way of quantifying power in the present context. Instead we provide graphical summaries of fit, which make clear whether a model captures the major trends in the data. These summaries average individual participant data and fits in the same way, so avoid the distortion that can be caused by fitting nonlinear models to averaged data (e.g., Heathcote, Brown, & Mewhort, 2000) .
Comparisons between models-both different parameterizations of the same model and between RD and LBA models-were performed using both the Bayesian (BIC) and Akaike (AIC) information criteria (Myung & Pitt, 1997) . The model with the smallest criterion value is selected as providing the best trade-off between fit and simplicity. Each criterion is the sum of the deviance (quantifying fit) and a term that penalizes model complexity. The penalty terms are increasing functions of the number of estimated model parameters (p): 2np for AIC and p ϫ log(n) for BIC. The value n used in BIC is the number of raw observations (not quantiles) used in fitting. AIC imposes a lesser penalty for complexity, and so BIC tends to choose simpler models than AIC. Each criterion makes differing assumptions (see Burnham & Anderson, 2004 , for a discussion and comparison) and can select different models. When both criteria agree there is a strong case for preferring the selected model, but otherwise more caution is warranted. Deviance and AIC can be summed over individual participant fits to summarize results. For BIC, D, p, and n must be summed over participants before calculating a summary result.
Ratcliff Diffusion Model Analysis
The RD model has four main parameter types: (a) the mean evidence accumulation starting point (z); (b) response threshold (a); (c) mean rate (v); and (d) mean nondecision (stimulus encoding and response production) time (T er ). We assumed that word responses were associated with the upper (a) threshold and nonword responses with the lower threshold, which by convention (and without loss of generality) is placed at zero. Note that the z This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
parameter determines response bias in the RD model, with the unbiased case corresponding to z ϭ a/2. We also made the conventional assumption that the diffusion coefficient (i.e., the standard deviation of moment-to-moment variability, s) has a value of 0.1 (the value used by Ratcliff and colleagues) for the control condition, but we estimated its value for the PM condition. Fixing s in one condition is required in order to make parameter estimates identifiable (see Donkin, Brown, & Heathcote, 2009 ). The diffusion model also had three trial-to-trial variability parameters, although these are typically of less psychological interest: (a) uniform start-point variability range (s z ); (b) standard deviation of normal rate variability (s v ); and (c) uniform nondecision time variability (s t ). In order to constrain nondecision time estimates to be positive we estimated the lower bound of nondecision time, T 0 , and s t on a logarithmic scale. Hence, the RD model selection tables are specified in terms of these two parameters. However, we report model-parameter analyses in terms of the conventional parameter, mean nondecision time, T er ϭ T 0 ϩ s t /2.
Results. The top row of Table 1 shows the RD model that we fit with the largest number of estimated parameters. This "top" model is specified in terms of the experimental factors affecting each parameter. In the top model a, v, s v , T er , and s t can vary a function of block type (PM vs. control) . This allowed us to investigate whether latent variables reflecting response threshold (a), evidence accumulation rate (v and s v ), nondecision time (T er and s t ) and response bias (z and s z ) were affected by PM demands. As outlined earlier, a decrease in mean rates with PM demands would be consistent with capacity-sharing theories of PM cost, and an increase in response threshold with PM demands would be consistent with the delay theory of PM costs. An increase in nondecision time would point to a source of delay external to the decision process. We also allowed v and s v to vary with stimulus type, as both parameters have been affected by these variables in other lexical decision data (e.g., Dutilh, Vandekerckhove, Tuerlinckx, & Wagenmakers, 2009; Wagenmakers et al., 2008) . Figure 2 shows the fit of the top RD model to error rates, the distribution of correct RT and median error RT. Correct RT distribution is shown by plotting the middle (50th) and extreme (10th and 90th) percentiles; intermediate percentiles displayed a similar pattern of fit and are omitted for clarity. For error responses many HF conditions had few observations, so only the median error RT is shown. Figure 2 shows that the most flexible RD model captures the overall pattern of results for error rates and correct RT distribution, except the LF versus NW difference in faster responses, and also the differences between block types and orders. However, it does not fully capture error RT, predicting slower responses for HF and LF words, and mostly faster response for NW stimuli, than was observed.
We also fit 1,023 other RD models consisting of all simplifications of the top model created by deleting one or more factors (i.e., as there 10 factors in the top row of Table 1 we fit 2 10 ϭ 1,024 RD models to each participant's data). Table 1 shows the models selected as best by AIC and BIC (i.e., the models with the lowest AIC and BIC values respectively). As expected, AIC selected a more complex model than BIC. Both AIC and BIC models agree that PM does not affect mean rate parameters, indicating no effect of PM demands on attentional capacity, but that it does affect the threshold parameters, indicating greater evidence required to make an ongoing task response in the PM block. The selection criteria disagree on the effect of PM on response bias and nondecision time, with AIC supporting an effect of PM on both and BIC not.
We used ANOVA to analyze the effects of experimental factors on parameter estimates from the top RD model, including block order as a between-subjects factor. Detailed results are reported in an appendix and summarized here. The starting point of evidence accumulation was biased toward words and rates were much higher and more variable for high than low frequency words. Nonwords were intermediate in terms of rate variability but the lowest in terms of means. As illustrated in Figure 3 effects of block type and order were negligible. In contrast these factors had significant main effects and interacted in threshold (a). When the PM block was first it had a much higher threshold than the control block, whereas thresholds were lower overall and differed little when the control block was first. Nondecision time was significantly slower in the PM than control block, by 0.02 s, regardless of block order.
Discussion. In our conventional ANOVA analysis we observed that mean RT for correct responses was slowest in the PM block when it was encountered first (0.71 s) and became faster (0.66 s) in the subsequent control block. When the control block was encountered first responding was faster (0.61 s) than in the subsequent PM block (0.64 s), but the PM slowing (0.035 s) was less than when the PM block was encountered first (0.055 s). The results of the RD-based analysis point to a two-factor explanation of this pattern of PM cost, a small but consistent slowing of nondecision by about 0.02 s for both block orders, and a higher response threshold for PM than control blocks. The threshold difference occurred mainly when the PM block was first, explaining the finding that for this order ongoing task accuracy on PM blocks was 2% higher than on control blocks, Note. PM ϭ prospective memory vs. control block factor and S ϭ stimulus factor (nonword, low frequency word, high frequency word). Fit is quantified by: D ϭ deviance (measure of misfit, necessarily smaller for the most complex top model); AIC ϭ Akaike Information Criterion; BIC ϭ Bayesian Information Criterion (in both cases smaller is better); p ϭ number of model parameters per subject. Parameters: A ϭ threshold; V and S V ϭ rate mean and standard deviation; T 0 ϭ minimum nondecision time; s t ϭ nondecision time range; s ϭ diffusion coefficient. Note that we fixed s ϭ .1 for the control condition. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
whereas there was only a negligible difference for the other order. When the PM block was encountered first the level of response threshold was also higher for control blocks, explaining the overall slower responding for this order. Our findings with respect to response threshold are consistent with Horn et al. (2011) and Boywitt and Rummel's (2012) betweensubjects design findings. To confirm that we also obtained this effect at the between subject level we analyzed only those threshold estimates coming from the first-presented block in our experiment. Even using this less powerful between-subjects analysis the threshold estimates for the PM block were significantly higher than for the control block, F(1, 45) ϭ 8.9, p Ͻ .01. The findings with respect to nondecision time agree with Boywitt and Rummel but not Horn et al.; the small increase in nondecision we observed in the within-subjects analysis was again confirmed by analysis at the between subjects level of our estimates from only the first-presented block, which were 24 ms longer for the PM than control block, although the effect was only marginally significant, F(1, 45) ϭ 3.03, p ϭ .09.
Finally, our results with respect to rate parameters agreed with neither Horn et al. (2011) nor Boywitt and Rummel (2012) . Analyses of the parameters of the RD model that allowed v and s v estimates to vary with block type did not provide any indication that the PM task reduced the capacity devoted to the ongoing task. When we analyzed rate estimates from the first-presented block the effect of PM on v was (s v , two right panels) estimates for the top Ratcliff diffusion model averaged over participants accompanied by within-subject error bars calculated using Morey's (2008) bias-corrected method. PM ϭ prospective memory; HF ϭ high-frequency words; LF ϭ low-frequency words; NW ϭ nonwords. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
nonsignificant, F(1, 45) ϭ 2.25, p ϭ .14, and in the wrong direction (PM ϭ 0.44, control ϭ 0.39), and the effect of PM on s v was also nonsignificant, F(1, 45) ϭ 2.31, p ϭ .14. Interpreting nonsignificant effects as evidence for no PM effect on rate is logically fraught, but it at least clear that any such effects are minor relative to nondecision, and in particular, to threshold effects. It is also worth noting that robust stimulus related rate effects were found so power is not an issue. Selection by both AIC and BIC favored models in which block type had no effect on either v or s v . In the case of the AIC-selected model these, and the PM effect on s and s z , were the only factors that were dropped, and the reduction in fit for this model relative to the top model (as tested by the increase in deviance) was negligible, (94) ϭ 231, p Ͻ .001). All of these analyses build a very strong case that PM effects on rate parameters are negligible and add virtually nothing to the RD model's ability to fit our data. In light of this conclusion we performed follow-up analyses on the parameters of the AIC-selected model that excluded PM rate effects, because allowing an overly flexible parameterization can sometimes result in trade-offs that wash out or otherwise substantially alter effects.
The same pattern of significance was found as in the full model for all of the effects remaining in the AIC model with one exception: a significant interaction between block order and type emerged in response bias (z), F(1, 45) ϭ 5.96, p Ͻ .05. The interaction occurred because the bias to respond word was higher in the control condition when it occurred first than in all other conditions, which had a similar level of bias. It appears that, when v and s v parameters cannot modulate the proportion of word responses as a function of block type, the RD model explains response bias purely in terms of its z parameter. In particular, participants had a bias toward a word response that was reduced when they encountered the PM task, so it was most marked when the control block was first.
Reducing word bias in the PM task makes sense, as PM responses in Experiment 1 were required twice as often for word than nonword stimuli. That is, a bias toward words might result in a lexical decision response more often preempting a PM response , in which case reducing the word bias would potentially improve PM performance. The persistence of reduced word bias when the control block was second is likely a carryover effect (Smith, 2010) .
The BIC-selected model dropped all but the largest effects of block type on the threshold and stimulus type on rate, resulting in a significant reduction in fit relative to the top model, 2 (564) ϭ 1258, p Ͻ .001. As noted by Burnham and Anderson (2004) BIC is commonly sensitive only to the largest effects in data unless power is high. The BIC results do strongly confirm a selective influence of stimulus type on mean rate and a selective influence of PM on the response threshold. From the Bayesian perspective the BIC results indicate these two effects have the highest predictive validity. Certainly the effect of stimulus type on rate is consistent with many other findings with the RD model in the lexical-decision task (e.g., Wagenmakers et al., 2008) and the effect of block type on threshold with the two previous studies that have fit the RD model (Boywitt & Rummel, 2012; Horn et al., 2011) .
Linear Ballistic Accumulator Analysis
LBA models have one accumulator for each response, so an LBA model of the lexical-decision task has a word and nonword accumulator, potentially with different parameter values. Each accumulator has the same types of trial-to-trial variability as the RD with analogous parameters; uniformly distributed start-point variability with a range 0 to A Ն 0, and a normally distributed rate with mean v and standard deviation s v . Each accumulator also has a response threshold b, where b Ն A (i.e., an accumulator cannot start above its threshold). We report results in terms of the distance the between the top of the start-point distribution and the response threshold, B ϭ b Ϫ A, where B Ն 0. Finally there is a nondecision time parameter, T er , which is assumed the same for both accumulators and does not have any between-trial variability. Neither restriction on T er is necessary, but they have been found to work well in previous LBA applications, including applications to the lexical-decision task. In contrast, T er variability is required for the RD to fit lexical decision data when assuming word frequency affects only rate parameters, see .
In order to describe LBA model parameterizations it is convenient to define a response factor, R, with levels corresponding to the word and nonword accumulators, and an accumulator correspondence factor, C, denoting the true (i.e., correct response) and false (i.e., error response) accumulator for a particular stimulus. For example, if the stimulus is a word then the word accumulator is designated "true" (i.e., matching the stimulus) and the nonword accumulator "false" (mismatching the stimulus). Response bias is modeled by allowing B to vary with the response factor, so that, for example, a bias to respond "word" correspond to a smaller value of B for the word than nonword accumulator. Response bias can also be caused by differences in A (as the average amount of evidence that must be accumulated to make a response is B ϩ A/2), but we assumed A was the same for both accumulators and all experimental conditions, so both response threshold and response bias were purely determined by B estimates. Again the restrictions on A are not necessary, but have been found to work well in previous applications. Heathcote and Hayes (2012) did find that A reduced with practice in a lexical-decision task. However, the practice effect was over many sessions and thousands of trials and so is unlikely to be of importance in the present application.
The fact that above-chance performance requires a higher evidence accumulation rate for the true than for the false accumulator is modeled by allowing v to vary with correspondence (C). In most past applications of the LBA s v has been fixed at one to make parameter estimates identifiable (see Donkin et al., 2009 ). However, Heathcote and Love (2012) found that fixing s v at one for only the false accumulator and allowing it to be estimated for the true accumulator produced markedly improved fits to lexical decision data. They consistently found that s v was less for the true than false accumulator, which was interpreted as due to a noisier match of a stimulus template to the wrong stimulus. We adopt this parameterization here, and also allowed s v to vary with PM.
Results. The first row of Table 2 shows the top LBA model. Consistent with the top RD model, we allowed the threshold parameter, B, T er , v and s v to vary with PM and v to also vary with stimulus type (S). This resulted in one fewer parameter (22) than This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. the top RD model, but the fit of the LBA model was markedly better than that of the top RD model-as evidenced by the substantially smaller deviance given in Table 2 -so no further flexibility was required. Note that deviance can only be used to perform a statistical test between nested models, so it cannot be used to test the difference in fit between the RD and LBA models. However, BIC and AIC can be compared between non-nested models; a comparison of Tables 2 and 3 shows that the BIC and AIC best LBA models were selected over the corresponding RD models. Indeed, the AIC-selected LBA model fits almost as well as the top RD model. Despite the differences in absolute levels of fit, both sets of model selection results tell the same story; PM is always selected as affecting only the response threshold, but not mean rate, whereas mean rate is consistently selected as being affected only by stimulus type. Similarly, for both RD and LBA models AIC selects an effect of PM on nondecision time, but BIC does not. Turning to the LBA specific factors, as expected accumulator correspondence (C) consistently affects both v and s v (in the case of s v the effect is only on the true accumulator as s v is fixed at one for the false accumulator). AIC selects an effect of the response factor (R) on response threshold (i.e., response bias) but BIC does not. The AIC result is analogous for RD and LBA, as both models let response bias vary with PM, but the BIC result for the LBA is analogous to fixing z ϭ a/2 for the RD, which is a parameterization we did not test.
As was the case for the RD model, the AIC-selected LBA model did not fit significantly worse than the top model 2 (376) ϭ 290, p Ͼ .999, but the BIC-selected model did, 2 (517) ϭ 845, p Ͻ .001. In contrast to the RD model, selectively dropping the effect of PM only on nondecision time (T er ) did not significantly reduce fit, 2 (47) ϭ 47, p ϭ .47. However, dropping response threshold and response bias effects (both mediated by B in the LBA) again produced a highly significant reduction in fit, 2 (141) ϭ 296, p Ͻ .001.
In light of the model selection results, we present further analysis of the AIC-selected LBA model here. A parallel analysis of the top LBA model is presented in supplementary materials (Section A); we discuss the differences between the two analyses after reporting the AIC-model analysis. Figure 4 shows that the AICselected LBA model provides an accurate account of most aspects of the data. A comparison of Figures 2 and 4 shows this account is better than the account provided by the top RD model, despite the AIC-selected LBA model having eight fewer estimated parameters. The LBA model is able to capture qualitative features of the data that the RD model could not, particularly nonword errors being slower than LF errors but correct responses for NW stimuli being faster than for LF stimuli.
Details of the ANVOA used to examine effects on the AICselected LBA model parameters, including block order as a between-subjects factor, are provided in the appendix. The right panel of Figure 5 shows effects on mean rate as a function of stimulus and accumulator type, where the upper and lower lines in the graph are the rates for the true and false accumulators respectively. The effects of rate on correct and error RT are largely determined by the true and false accumulator rates respectively, and the effect of rate on accuracy is largely determined by the difference between true and false accumulator rates. Stimulus had a strong main effect and also interacted with accumulator type; the order of point in the upper line reflects the order of correct mean RT over stimulus types and the difference between lines (2.6 for HF, 0.7 for LF, and 1.9 for NW) reflects the ordering over stimulus type of accuracy results.
As illustrated in Figure 5 , there was a significant overall bias to respond word (i.e., a lower value of B for the word accumulator) and a higher threshold in PM than control blocks. The bias effect interacted with block type and block order in the same way as for the RD model. The word bias was largest in the control block when it occurred first, with a less and equal bias in all other conditions. The same interpretation applies as for the RD model; with the predominance of PM target words in the PM blocks of Experiment 1 participants became less word biased in order not to preempt a PM response with a lexical decision response , and this effect carried over to the control block when it occurred after a PM block.
Results for threshold and rate parameters are consistent between RD and LBA models, but the two models disagreed with respect to Heathcote and Love (2012) , the s v value for the true accumulator was significantly lower than for the false accumulator.
Discussion. As was the case for the RD model, some conclusions based on analyses of LBA parameter differed markedly depending on whether those parameters came from the top model or the AIC-selected model. As detailed in supplementary materials (Section A), the top LBA model attributed all block order and block type effects to differences in mean rate parameters. In contrast the AIC-selected model attributed these effects to differences in threshold parameters. The threshold interpretation is clearly more strongly supported as it is consistent with both AIC and BIC model selection, and because the top model provided only a negligible improvement in fit over the AIC-selected model while This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
requiring a more than 40% increase in the number of estimated parameters. Hence, we focus on the AIC-selected LBA model from this point. The AIC-selected LBA model agreed with the RD model in attributing stimulus effects to the mean rate parameter. However, because the LBA had the flexibility to specify different rates associated with matches to corresponding stimuli (e.g., the word accumulator rate associated with word stimuli) and noncorresponding stimuli (e.g., the nonword accumulator rate associated with word stimuli) it was able to provide a qualitatively accurate account of the effects of stimulus type on error RT, whereas the RD model did not. The LBA model also provided a better quantitative account of other aspects of the data, probably because attempting to accommodate the error RT pattern caused some distortion of other estimates for the RD model. Likely for similar reasons, the models differed in that the RD model had a much greater level of start-point noise (i.e., random response bias) than the LBA model. We found that errors were slower than correct responses for words but not nonwords. In principle both the LBA and RD models can accommodate this pattern of results with a low level of start-point noise, which leads to slow errors overall, and a bias toward words, which speeds word errors and slows nonword errors. In practice the LBA model but not the RD model achieved this accommodation.
The LBA and RD models also agreed in their characterization of how response threshold and response bias changed with block type and block order. In both models there was a word bias, due to a shorter average distance from the evidence start point to the word than nonword threshold, with this difference being larger in control blocks when they occurred first. However, the LBA model attributed all block order and block type effects to threshold differences, whereas the RD model attributed these effects in part to a slower nondecision time in PM blocks. Given the clear superiority of the LBA account of the present data, both descriptively and in terms of both AIC and BIC model selection, one might conclude that the overall evidence for an effect of PM on nondecision processes (Boywitt & Rummel, 2012) is weak or at best model dependent. On that view, it appears that, at least in our data, PM cost is explained mainly by response threshold.
Our analysis differs in a crucial respect from those of Horn et al. (2011) and Boywitt and Rummel (2012) ; they concluded that PM affects evidence accumulation rate, whereas we concluded that it does not. One reason for the difference might be our use of a within-subjects design whereas they use a between-subjects design. Although we did find clear carryover effects from our use of a within-subjects PM design, the results of the between-subjects analysis of our first-block data makes it unlikely that this caused our conclusions to differ. A second possibility relates to task differences. Horn et al. modeled Smith's (2003) data, which used the same ongoing task (lexical decision) but a different PM task (contingent on particular words), whereas Boywitt and Rummel used both a different ongoing task (color matching) and a different PM task (also contingent on particular words). A third possibility is that problems in their model analysis-such as failing to specify a model that accommodates influential experimental manipulations including stimulus type, or nuisance effects, such as practice-produced spurious conclusions. In order to address the latter two possibilities we performed a reanalysis of their data, with detailed results reported in supplementary materials and summarized below. Horn et al. (2011 ) examined Smith's (2003 seminal finding that participants were slower to perform a lexical-decision task when they had concurrent PM task requirements compared to participants who performed lexical decision only. Before commencing the lexical-decision task, the PM groups memorized six words and were instructed to press the F1 key if any of these words were presented during the lexical-decision task. Their "No-PM" control group also memorized the six target words, thereby equating retrospective memory load, but were told that they would not have to make PM responses during the lexical-decision task. The task requirement of making a PM response to any one of several previously studied words that are presented in an ongoing task is common, and consistently produces costs to ongoing tasks (e.g., Brandimonte et al., 2001; Cohen et al., 2008; Loft & Yeo, 2007; Marsh et al., 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004 Smith et al., 2007; . Detailed results of our reanalysis of Smith's data are presented in supplementary materials (Section B).
Reevaluation of Previous Model-Based Evidence
An important detail of Smith's (2003) design is that the word set used for lexical decision was presented twice, in different random orders. We found that response bias, stimulus type, and stimulus repetition all had significant effects on mean correct RT and/or accuracy, and some of these effects differed between PM and No-PM groups. Horn et al. (2011) did not allow for these effects in their RD analysis, potentially confounding their findings; in contrast we modeled all of these effects. We also found substantial practice effects within the first and second halves of each experiment (i.e., a practice effect additional to the item-specific improvement in speed and accuracy due to repetition) that significantly interacted with other experimental factors, further challenging the validity of Horn et al.'s analysis. As well as fitting models to the full data set we also fit the second repetition data alone in an attempt to address the issue of practice effects. Although still significant, practice effects in the second half were weaker and did not interact with other factors.
As for our first experiment, model selection slightly favored the LBA over the RD model, but both provided a quite accurate account of the data, with the RD model mainly lacking in its account of accuracy and error RT. For the RD model an inconsistent picture emerged for fits to full and second repetition data sets; in both cases the mean rate was greater in No-PM than PM but a greater threshold for PM was found only in the second repetition fit. Conversely, nondecision time was longer and more variable for PM than no-PM in the full data set fit, but neither effect was present in the 2nd repetition fits. These differences indicate that aggregating over practice effects significantly changed modelbased results. In the same vein, Horn et al. 's (2011) analysis of the full data set may have failed to find the nondecision effect we found because it aggregated over strong stimulus type and repetition factors. These discrepancies starkly illustrate why it is hazardous when fitting evidence accumulation models to aggregate over substantial effects-even though those effects are of a "nuisance" nature not central to the question of interest. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Horn et al. 's (2011) RD model assumed there was no response bias. In contrast, for fits to both the full data set and the second repetition data, we found a significant bias to nonword responses in the PM condition and bias to word responses in the No-PM condition. Consistent with Experiment 1, this finding indicates that participants slowed their word responding in order to avoid preempting PM responses, which were only required with word stimuli as all PM targets in Smith's (2003) experiment were words. This slowing is clearly evident in a substantially longer mean correct RT for words than nonwords, and was not due to a difference in rate, which was estimated as almost identical for word and nonword stimuli.
Assuming results from the second repetition analysis should be preferred over the analysis of the full data set because of a lesser practice effect, our analysis confirms Horn et al. 's (2011) conclusion that for the RD model PM lowers rates and results in participants strategically increasing response thresholds. It also refines the latter conclusion, indicating that participants used the fact that a PM response was only potentially required for word stimuli to strategically bias their responding against words in the PM condition. However, we do not think this evidence based on RD model fits is very strong for two reasons. First, it was not supported by an LBA analysis; in this analysis no effects on parameters were significant in the second repetition analysis and the few effects that were significant in the full data analysis were inconsistent with the results found for the RD model analysis. This inconsistency stands in marked contrast to the close agreement between RD and LBA results that we observed for our Experiment 1. Second, it is important to acknowledge that even the second repetition data displayed practice effects more than double those in our data, and so some caution in interpretation of even these results remains warranted.
Next we reanalysed Boywitt and Rummel's (2012) data. They reported two experiments. Both used an ongoing color-matching task with six distinct stimulus colors. On each trial four differently colored rectangles were presented followed by a colored word, with six words designated as PM targets. Participants studied these six target words for 5 s each prior to commencing the colormatching task. Participants who could not recall all of the target words posttest were excluded from further analyses. In the ongoing task one key was pressed if the word's color matched the color of one of the previously presented rectangles and another key if not, unless a PM target word appeared, in which case an alternative key was pressed. Reading words was not necessary to complete the ongoing color-matching task and is thus considered a nonfocal PM task.
In the first experiment one group was told that only 10% of participants would see PM targets (the low PM expectancy condition) and another group were told that 90% of participants would see PM targets (the high PM expectancy condition). In fact, all participants were shown equal numbers of targets. In a second experiment one group of participants received no PM task (control condition), one group did the same nonfocal PM task as in the first experiment (demanding condition), and one group did a nondemanding PM task, where the PM target was a string of red Xs (note that in all three conditions none of the words was colored red). Target expectancy was not manipulated in Experiment 2.
We focused our reanalysis on their second experiment (see supplementary materials, Section C, for details), both because the manipulation in experiment one did not include a control group to test PM cost, and because it contained substantial practice effects that did not decrease over the course of the experiment. Strong practice effects were also present in their second experiment, but they were much weaker in the last half of trials, so we decided to proceed with a model analysis of the last half data set as well as the full data set. However, we anticipated that parameter estimates for the last half data would be imprecise due to low trial numbers (even the full data set consisted of only 170 trials per participant). Further, and in contrast to Boywitt and Rummel (2012) , we thought it was essential to allow for both stimulus type and response bias in our model analysis due to significant effects of these factors that were evident in mean correct RT and/or accuracy. The extra parameter that had to be estimated made the model-based analysis even more challenging.
As in previously reported analyses, the LBA model was preferred in terms of goodness-of-fit and both AIC and BIC model selection. However, once again both models were similarly effective in capturing qualitative trends. Unfortunately, as anticipated, using only the second half of the data reduced power to such a degree that few effects on RD or LBA parameters were significant, with no significant effects related to PM. For the LBA analysis of the full data set there were also no significant effects related to PM. However, for the RD analysis of the full data set the threshold and nondecision time mean and variability were higher for the demanding PM condition than the other conditions. Also, there was a significant interaction for mean rate between PM and stimulus type (match vs. mismatch); the average of the PM conditions was less than the control condition for matching stimuli, whereas only the demanding PM condition had a lower rate, for mismatching stimuli.
In summary, our reanalysis with the RD model of Boywitt and Rummel's (2012) full data set from their second experiment supports their conclusions in favor of a higher threshold and longer T er for the demanding PM condition, and extends it to a similar effect on nondecision variability. It also provides some support for their conclusion favoring a lower mean rate for the demanding PM condition. However, Boywitt and Rummel's data sets contain the largest and fastest practice effects of any we have examined in this article. We attempted to address this issue by analyzing only the second half of their data. Trends in T er and mean rate consistent with the full data set remained but were not significant and the effect on threshold disappeared. Our reanalysis with the LBA model, which fit a little better than the RD model, found few significant effects for either the full or second half data sets.
All in all these results suggest that, once substantial and significant effects of response bias, stimulus type, and practice are taken into account, Boywitt and Rummel (2012) data does not support strong conclusions based on the results of evidence accumulation modeling. In particular, the large practice effects in Boywitt and Rummel's experiment-which likely occurred because their ongoing task is unfamiliar and quite complex, involving a short-term memory (STM) scanning process with four items-are problematic. Further, although evidence accumulation has been used to model STM scanning, it has been only one part of a more complex higher order process model (e.g., Nosofsky, Little, Donkin, & Fific, 2011) . In contrast to analyses of an ongoing lexical-decision task, where the standard RD and LBA models have been widely applied, this raises the issue of whether Boywitt and Rummel's RD This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
model analysis of a complex ongoing task using a standard RD model, and both of our RD and LBA model based analyses of Boywitt and Rummel's data are valid. We conclude that neither Boywitt and Rummel's data, nor that of Smith (2003) reanalysed by Horn et al. (2011) , provide a sufficient basis for firm model-based conclusions about the causes underlying PM costs. In contrast to our Experiment 1 model analyses, in both cases RD and LBA models do not provide consistent accounts. Further, both data sets contain strong practice effects that are difficult to control and can potentially confound conclusions. Compounding these problems, the between-subjects designs in these experiments did not allow us to bring model selection techniques to bear within a model class, so we were not able to cross check the results of parameter analyses as we could for our experiment one data. The example provided by LBA model fits to our data-that fitting an overly complex model can lead to what appeared to be spurious parameter analysis results-again causes us to recommend caution in interpreting the results of conclusions based on both the original model-based analyses reported by these authors and our reanalysis. In particular, taking the analyses of our data, Smith's data and Boywitt and Rummel's data together, the case for a PM effect on the rate of evidence accumulation, and hence the support for capacity-sharing theories of PM cost, is weak.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1 participants performed an ongoing lexicaldecision task including low frequency words. This allowed us to avoid ceiling effects, which make it difficult to measure potential speed-accuracy trade-offs when participants have PM task requirements. Evidence for an effect of PM on the mean rate parameter was weak, and our model fits predominantly supported the conclusion that PM task increased the ongoing task response threshold. However, it is noteworthy that costs in Experiment 1, although comparable in magnitude to when other nonfocal PM tasks have been embedded in lexical decision tasks (such as category exemplar targets; Loft & Humphreys, 2012; Marsh et al., 2003) , were relatively small (0.055 s or less). Rate effects might be more likely under conditions were there is a larger cost to the ongoing lexicaldecision task.
Experiment 2 uses a PM task requiring participants to detect a syllable ("tor") in an ongoing lexical-decision task. This commonly used PM task is considered nonfocal because lexical decision does not necessarily require syllable detection (e.g., Brewer et al., 2010; Lourenço et al., 2013; Meeks et al., 2007; Meeks & Marsh, 2010; Scullin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2010) . This type of nonfocal PM task also typically produces larger costs to ongoing lexical decisions than other types of nonfocal tasks (e.g., Meeks et al., 2007; Meeks & Marsh, 2010) . Thus, Experiment 2 aims to both determine whether rate effects emerge when PM costs are larger and also allows us to test whether our modeling results generalize to another nonfocal PM task that is commonly used in the PM literature.
Method
Participants. Forty-eight undergraduates participated in return for course credit. Participants were tested individually with and equal number randomly allocated to PM-block-first and control-block-first conditions.
Stimuli. The stimuli were identical to Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. First, all stimuli were displayed in white on a black background. Second, there were nine PM targets that contained the syllable "tor," three were HF words (history, story, senator), three were LF words (tutorial, ancestor, tortoise), and three were NW (torpun, cintor, extoruar). As in Experiment 1, the order of presentation of words and nonwords within each set was random, except for the presentation of PM targets. For each participant, six target trials were word stimuli (three LF and three HF) and three NW stimuli. The assignment of target stimuli types (HF, LF, or NW) to trial sequence was counterbalanced across participants.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 with one exception. Under PM conditions participants were instructed to press the "F1" key when presented with a letter string that contained the syllable TOR.
Results
The results were analyzed in the same way as Experiment 1. On average participants correctly responded to 50% of PM targets. Once again participants rarely made PM false alarms, on average 0.09%; 36 of the 48 participants made none and the remainder only made 0.2%-0.7%.
In the ongoing task we removed trials with an RT greater than three standard deviations above the mean for each participant (1.9%) or less than 0.3 s (0.06%). Detailed ANOVA analyses of mean RT and error rates are reported in the appendix and summarized here. No effects involving block half were significant, suggesting that as in Experiment 1 within-block fatigue and practice effects were negligible. As illustrated in Figure 6 , RT was similar for nonwords and low-frequency words, but significantly faster (by 0.13 s on average) for high-frequency words. Stimulus type also had a highly significant effect on errors, which were highest for low-frequency words, rare for high-frequency words and intermediate for nonwords.
As expected, RT was greater by a large amount (0.145 s) in PM than control blocks. The difference was fairly homogenous over stimulus and block type, except for nonwords, where it was 0.06 s larger when the PM block was first. Overall these effects are quite similar to Experiment 1; in particular nonword stimuli also showed a greater PM effect when the PM block was first in Experiment 1. A slight difference from Experiment 1 was that there was no hint of a difference in the PM effects depending on whether the PM block was first or second (0.148 s vs. 0.141 s, respectively, F Ͻ 1), whereas in Experiment 1 the PM effect decreased from 0.055 s to 0.035 s.
For error rates another significant interaction reflected a small inhomogeneity in the PM effect on error rates, 3% greater PM than control accuracy for low-frequency words when the PM block was first, but little difference when it was second. We again used t tests, omitting subjects who made no errors in a particular contrast, to compare correct and error mean RT; errors were generally slower This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
than correct responses but the difference was only significant for nonwords and low-frequency words in the control block. RD model analysis. We fit 1,024 RD models to each participant's data, requiring a total of 245,808 fits, with Table 3 providing the model selection results. In contrast to Experiment 1, we found a substantial effect of block type (PM vs. control) on start-point variability (sz) in the RD model, so the resulting top model had 22 parameters. Figure 7 shows the fit of the AICselected RD model. As in Experiment 1 the fit to correct RT distribution was good, but there was evidence of some misfit for error frequency and RT. This pattern of fit was not appreciably different in similar graphs showing the fit of the top model. AIC model selection rejected any effect of PM on RD rate parameters. In contrast, PM affected all of the other parameters associated with setting evidence thresholds and response bias and with nondecision time. BIC selected a very simple RD model where PM only affected the threshold. For the top RD model there was a significant block type by stimulus interaction, F(2, 94) ϭ 21.6, ε ϭ .8, p Ͻ .001, in mean drift rate (v), due to a 0.17 decrease for PM relative to control for high frequency words, whereas PM had no effect on other stimulus types. PM did not participate in any significant effects on drift rate variability (s v ) or the diffusion coefficient (s) , and the decrease in fit for the AIC model, which dropped only PM effects on the three rate parameters, was not significant, 2 (327) ϭ 336, p ϭ .63. In contrast, highly significant decreases in fit were produced by selectively dropping the PM effect on parameters related to threshold (a, 2 (48) ϭ 124, p Ͻ .001), bias (z and s z , 2 (96) ϭ 158, p Ͻ .001) and nondecision time (T er and s t , 2 (96) ϭ 163, p Ͻ .001). Hence, we focus on parameter effects for the AIC-selected RD model, consistent with our analysis of Experiment 1. Detailed ANOVA analyses of this model are reported in an appendix with results summarized here. Figure 6 . Experiment 2 mean RT for correct responses and error rates for each stimulus type (HF ϭ high frequency words, LF ϭ low frequency words and NW ϭ nonwords) and block order. Data are plotted with within-subject error bars using Morey's (2008) bias-corrected method. PM ϭ prospective memory; RT ϭ reaction time; HF ϭ high-frequency words; LF ϭ low-frequency words; NW ϭ nonwords. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Mean rate differed significantly with stimulus type, decreasing from high-frequency words to nonwords to low-frequency words. Rate variability also varied significantly with stimulus type, decreasing from high-to low-frequency words then further for nonwords. More evidence (i.e., an increased response threshold) was required for a response in PM than control blocks, and this was particularly the case when the PM block was first. There was a significant overall word bias, and this bias interacted with block: control blocks occurring first had a strong word bias that largely disappeared in the subsequent PM block, whereas both block types had a similar and intermediate word bias when the PM block occurred first. Starting point variability was also larger in PM than control blocks. Finally, mean nondecision time (T er ) was significantly larger, by 0.05 s, in the PM than control block, with no significant difference as a function of whether the PM block was first or second.
LBA model analysis. We fit 512 LBA models to each participant's data, requiring a total of 110,640 fits, with Table  4 providing model selection results. Given the substantial effect of block type on start-point variability in the RD model we also allowed the analogous LBA parameter (A) to vary with block type. Consistent with results for Experiments 1, the LBA model provided a better fit and was selected by AIC over the RD model. In contrast to Experiment 1, this was not the case for BIC, which selected a very simple RD model with only two effects. Note that our purpose is not to determine whether the RD or LBA model is better, but rather to assess whether they lead to consistent psychological conclusions, so we do not pursue selection between model types further here.
For the top LBA model mean rate estimates were highly variable, resulting in very large error terms in rate-parameter ANOVAs and some implausible patterns in marginal means. For example, the main effect of stimulus type and the interaction of stimulus type and its interaction with matching versus mismatching accumulator-both of which were highly significant in Experiment 1-had weak effects, F(2, 94) ϭ 3.28, ε ϭ .5, p ϭ .07 and F(2, 94) ϭ 4.12, ε ϭ .52, p ϭ .047, respectively. The corresponding marginal means were HF ϭ Ϫ2.9, LF ϭ 1.4, NW ϭ 1.1 and matching minus mismatching accumulator differences were HF ϭ 11.1, LF ϭ 0.9, NW ϭ 2.1. PM marginal means were also unusual, and even though the main effect of PM was highly significant, F(1, 47) ϭ 21.6, p Ͻ .001 (PM ϭ 0.11, control ϭ Ϫ0.4), and the interaction with match just reached significance, F(1, 47) ϭ 4.25, p ϭ .045, the reduction in fit for the model that dropped the PM effect on v did not approach significance, 2 (288) ϭ 209, p Ͼ .999. This type of large variability in parameter estimates is associated with trade-offs among parameters that often attend fits of an overly complex model. In concert with the negligible impact on fit, they indicate that there is little support for a PM on the v parameter.
In contrast, there was clear evidence that rate variability (s v Figure 8 illustrates the fit of the AIC-selected LBA model; the same graph for top-model fits did not differ appreciably. As for Experiment 1, the LBA model provided a similar account of the distribution of RT for correct responses to the RD model and a clearly better account of error frequency and RT. Consistent with the AIC model, there was a significant effect on fit of selectively dropping from the top model the bias and PM effects on the threshold parameter, Stimulus effects were selectively reflected in mean rates (v), with the difference between matching and mismatching accumulators accounting differences in accuracy. PM influenced both the threshold (B) and rate standard deviation (s v ) parameters. The latter effect was due to s v being smaller for the matching accumulator in the control Figure 8 . Akaike Information Criterion (and Bayesian Information Criterion) selected LBA model fits to Experiment 2 to error rates (left column), RT distribution for correct responses (10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles, middle column) and the 50th percentile (median) for error responses (right column). Top row: control-first results. Bottom row: PM first-results. Data are plotted accompanied by within-subject error bars calculated using Morey's (2008) bias-corrected method. LBA ϭ linear ballistic accumulator; PM ϭ prospective memory; RT ϭ reaction time; HF ϭ high-frequency words; LF ϭ low-frequency words; NW ϭ nonwords. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
condition than in the PM condition, whereas mismatching accumulators were almost twice as variable and unaffected by PM. As was the case in Experiment 1, the response threshold was significantly larger for the PM than the control block. In contrast to Experiment 1, there was a bias to nonword responding in Experiment 2, and whether the first block was control or PM, bias decreased in the second block.
Discussion
In Experiment 2 we succeeded in producing a PM effect almost three times larger in mean RT than in Experiment 1, and in keeping with larger PM effects in studies similar to Experiment 2 previously reported in the literature. As in Experiment 1, we once again found strong and consistent evidence that PM demand affects response threshold. Both RD and LBA models indicated that participants required a larger amount of evidence before responding to the ongoing task when they were concurrently faced with PM demands. According to delay theory, requiring more evidence slows lexical-decision task responses, and so reduces the probability that the ongoing task response will preempt the PM response.
As in Experiment 1, only the RD model provided evidence for PM demands slowing nondecision time (T er ). The same T er effect was observed whether the control block was first or second (0.05 s), and the effect was larger than for Experiment 1 (0.02 s). Nondecision time explained 35% of the 0.145 s difference in mean RT between PM and control blocks, a smaller proportion than the 57% of the small 0.035 s effect when the control block was first in Experiment 1, but very similar to the 37% of the 0.055 s effect on mean RT when the PM block was first in Experiment 1.
Overall, it appears that the RD model unambiguously supports delay theory for around two thirds of PM cost in mean RT. Whether the remainder supports a delay theory or capacity-sharing theory interpretation depends on how the nondecision time effect is interpreted. Because T er does not affect error rates, the RD model explains all of the increase in error rates in the PM block (2% in the PM block when it occurred first in Experiment 1 and 3% for LF words in the PM blocks in Experiment 2) through an increase in the response threshold. Hence, according to the RD model, all of the lexical decision accuracy effects support the delay theory. There was no evidence for an effect of PM demand on either the mean or standard deviation of evidence accumulation rates or the diffusion coefficient.
For the LBA model there was no support for an effect of PM demand on the mean rate of evidence accumulation but, in contrast to Experiment 1, there was clear evidence for the rate standard deviation being affected by PM. However, it is not clear why capacity-sharing PM theories would predict an effect on rate variability without an effect on mean rates. It may be that PM demands make it more difficult to allocate attention to the ongoing task in a consistent manner. However, as there was no effect on the mean rate, there must be trials where extra capacity is available as well as trials where less capacity is available. Furthermore, as threshold (B, supporting delay theory) and rate standard deviation (s v ) parameters mediated the PM effect, the question arises as to what portion of PM cost, which was mainly expressed in RT in Experiment 2, each parameter effect explains. Figure 9 illustrates the effect of PM on correct RT distribution and median error RT averaged over all other conditions. The left panel shows the AIC-selected LBA model gives a good account of the PM effect on median error RT and the increasing PM effect across the distribution for correct RT. The other panels show model fit when either the PM effect on s v (middle panel) or the PM effect on B (right panel) is removed from the AIC model. That is, the middle panels show the effect explained purely by B, and the right panels show the effect explained purely by s v .
Clearly the majority of PM cost in correct RT is consistent with delay theory, with the s v parameter only explaining a minority of the cost mainly in the slower responses (i.e., the upper lines representing the 90th percentile). For error RT both factors appear to explain roughly equal proportions (note that because interactions among parameters are nonlinear the effect of two parameters together need not equal the sum of the effects of each individually). To quantify these contributions we examined the proportions of the PM effects on median RT-0.105 s for correct RT and 0.156 s for error RT-explained by each model. The combined effects in the AIC model were 0.102 s and 0.142 s, respectively, close to the observed values.
1 For correct RT, the B parameter alone explained 0.075 s and the s v parameter had no effect. For error RT, the B parameter alone explained 0.071 s and the s v parameter 0.87 s. Given errors were in the minority (10% in Experiment 2), this equates to 95% of the PM effect in RT explained by the threshold parameter.
Hence, the LBA-model results unambiguously support our delay theory for at least the same two thirds of the larger PM costs on RT in Experiment 2 as the RD model. In the next section we examine data from a very similar paradigm to Experiment 2 in order to see if this theoretically ambiguous effect of PM demand on rate variability is again observed. However, the main reason for this extra analysis is to further test the delay theory explanation of the majority of PM costs being caused by the strategic setting of thresholds. demonstrated that an externally imposed delay improves PM performance. Our results so far indicate that costs associated with PM demands are mainly caused by an increase in ongoing task response thresholds. However, this does not necessarily mean thresholds were adjusted strategically (i.e., deliberately raised to increase the time for the PM task to reach response selection), as is assumed by the delay theory. For example, participants may have responded more cautiously by raising their thresholds simply because they perceived PM blocks to be harder than control blocks without any specific association with expected performance on trials with PM targets. This possibility represents a major challenge to the utility of the PM cost paradigm as a tool for investigating PM. Here we analyze data reported by Lourenço et al. (2013) that can shed light on this issue. Their data allowed an evaluation of response threshold increases that were specific to the type of item that could contain a PM target. Finding PM effects only for these items would support PM 1 For the 0.06-s effect on the 10th percentile B alone explained 0.056 s and s v none, whereas for the 0.256 s effect on the 90th percentile B alone explained 0.112 s and s v 0.024 s. Overall error rates were 0.3% less in PM than control blocks; the model with only a B effect on PM predicted a 0.4% increase whereas the model with only an s v effect on PM predicted a 2% decrease. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
PM-Specific Slowing
costs representing a strategic response by participants to improve PM target detection. In Experiment 1 both RD and LBA models indicated a response bias effect consistent with participants adjusting their response threshold to avoid preempting PM responses (i.e., PM specific slowing). In Experiment 1 PM responses were required twice as often for word as nonword stimuli. Participants displayed an overall bias toward word responses that reduced when they encountered the PM task. According to delay theory, this more cautious responding to words decreased the probably that lexical-decision task word response would preempt the PM response on target trials. However, in Experiment 2, which also required PM responses twice as often to words as nonwords, the models indicated contradictory response biases, and only the RD model produced a pattern of bias adjustment that would help to avoid preempting PM responses. If delay theory mediated by a strategic threshold adjustment account is correct, then one might predict clearer bias effects if PM demands were associated with only one type of stimulus. Lourenço et al. (2013) reported data suited to testing this prediction, as PM targets occurred in words in their design and never in nonwords, and some participants were actually informed of this fact when presented the PM instructions. They used a very similar PM task to our Experiment 2, requiring a PM response when participants detected the syllable "tor" in a lexical-decision task stimulus. However, their lexical-decision task was relatively easy, with overall error rate of less than 4%. Three groups of participants performed two blocks of a lexical-decision task; two groups were subject to PM requirements in the second block, and a third control group that had no PM requirement in either block. The design for the two PM groups enabled us to apply the full set of modelselection tests that we brought to bear on our data. (2013) did not counterbalance PM and control blocks and so their design could suffer from confounding by practice and fatigue effects. Indeed, their control condition produced a large decrease of 0.17 s in correct RT from the first to second block, F(1, 26) ϭ 81, p Ͻ .001, and a decrease of 0.11 s between block halves in the first block, reducing to 0.015 s in the second block, as reflected in a significant interaction, F(1, 26) ϭ 27, p Ͻ .001. There was also a halves effect of 0.078s in the noncontrol groups, F(1, 72) ϭ 56, p Ͻ .001, but it did not interact with blocks, F Ͻ 1. None of the effects significant in correct mean RT were significant in accuracy. However, in the noncontrol conditions the PM block was more accurate, F(1, 72) ϭ 7.9, p Ͻ .006, as well as slower, than the control block, consistent with a speed-accuracy trade-off and with our model-based analysis. This provides reassurance against confounding in the noncontrol conditions from practice and fatigue effects, which should affect speed and accuracy in the same direction. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
The two PM groups differed in participants' expectations regarding the PM target context. The specific group was instructed that the PM target syllables would occur in words only, whereas the nonspecific group was told they would occur in both words and nonwords. In reality targets only ever occurred in words. According to the delay theory account of PM costs, it would make sense for participants to only exercise increased response threshold for the type of stimulus that could potentially require a PM response (i.e., words). Even when the occurrence of a word or nonword is unpredictable, as in Lourenço et al.'s (2013) experiment, this can be achieved by a change in bias: setting a higher threshold for the word accumulator in the LBA or by starting accumulation further from the word boundary in the RD model.
It also seems likely that the magnitude of the bias will be greater in the specific than nonspecific condition, given participants are aware of the word-specific nature of PM targets from the start of the block.
After each lexical decision response in Lourenço et al.'s (2013) experiment a waiting message appeared on the screen and participants pressed a spacebar to proceed. The instruction used in our Experiment 1 and 2, and by Smith (2003) and Boywitt and Rummel (2012) -for participant's to make the PM response when the target was presented-is common in the PM literature (e.g., Loft & Humphreys, 2012; McDaniel et al., 2011; Scullin, McDaniel, Shelton et al., 2010; Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004; Smith et al., 2007; Taylor et al., 2004) . It typically results in participants choosing to respond by pressing the PM response key instead of the ongoing task response key. In contrast, Lourenço et al. instructed participants to always make the ongoing task response, then to press the space bar to initiate the next trial unless they had previously detected the target syllable, in which case they were to instead press the "F6" key.
Other PM researchers have also used Lourenço et al.'s (2013) PM instruction (e.g., Loft, Humphreys & Whitney, 2008; Loft & Yeo, 2007; Marsh et al., 2005 Marsh et al., , 2003 Meeks & Marsh, 2010; Meeks et al., 2007) , although it might be argued to be less relevant to PM tasks outside the laboratory, which usually interrupt other activities (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996; . In any case, the analysis we now present further tests the generality of our findings under this alternative method of sequentially eliciting an ongoing response followed by PM response. Requiring more evidence before responding to stimuli that are potentially PM targets continues to make sense as a way of avoiding PM errors with this alternative method if terminating stimulus processing (response selection) to make an ongoing task response interrupts the response selection processes required to detect the PM target. However, it also seems likely that PM accuracy might be better using the alternative method and that PM costs, and corresponding PM effects on ongoing task model parameters may be reduced, as a response to the ongoing task does not deny the possibility (i.e., preempt) a PM response as it does with the more standard method.
In line with this expectation, Lourenço et al. 's (2013) PM accuracy rates for both the specific (78%) and nonspecific (77%) conditions were noticeably higher than in our second experiment (50%). In addition, PM cost in correct RT, although significant, F(1, 72) ϭ 10.1, p ϭ .002, was much smaller (0.04 s) than in our second experiment, even though both required detection of the same PM target. This reduction was in part due to the fact that costs for nonwords were virtually nonexistent, whereas they were significantly larger (0.08s) for word stimuli, F(1, 72) ϭ 7.92, p ϭ .006. The difference between word and nonword costs was also significantly greater for the specific condition (0.13 s) than for the nonspecific condition (0.06 s), F(1, 72) ϭ 5.36, p ϭ .02. In the nonspecific and specific conditions PM cost was almost identical for words (0.09 s), but reduced to 0.03 s for nonwords in the nonspecific condition and reversed (i.e., faster responses in the PM than control block) by 0.04 s for nonwords in the specific condition.
This reversal in costs for nonwords in the specific condition, which although small was significantly different from zero, t(35) ϭ 2.1, p ϭ .04, challenges capacity-sharing theories of PM. Lourenço et al. (2013) attempted to explain their item-specific effects using traditional capacity-sharing mechanism, but it is unclear how or why PM demands would make extra capacity available for nonwords in the specific condition. In contrast this finding has a straightforward explanation in terms of delay theory. Participants respond less cautiously, and so more quickly, to nonwords than words in the specific condition, because they know nonwords will not require a PM response. We directly test this explanation by fitting the evidence accumulation models to the Lourenço et al. data.
We fit similar models to Experiment 2, allowing PM to affect all parameters, which resulted in a slightly more complex (21 parameter) LBA than RD (19 parameter) model. Tables 5 and 6 show selection results for fits of the RD and LBA models, based on 1,024 fits per participant and 517,221 fits in total for each type of model. In contrast to earlier analyses, the top RD model provided a slightly better fit than the top LBA model, despite having two less parameters, and the RD model was selected by AIC and BIC. AIC and BIC rejected an effect of PM on rate for both models, in Top  PM  S, PM  S, PM  PM  PM  PM  PM  PM  19  1712  4524  13295  AIC  PM  S  S  PM  -PM  --12  2248  4024  9564  B I C  P M  --P M  ----9  2914  4246  8401 Note. PM ϭ prospective memory vs. control block factor and S ϭ stimulus factor (nonword, low frequency word, high frequency word). Fit is quantified by: D ϭ deviance (measure of misfit, necessarily smaller for the most complex top model); AIC ϭ Akaike Information Criterion; BIC ϭ Bayesian Information Criterion (in both cases smaller is better); p ϭ number of model parameters per subject. Parameters: A ϭ threshold; v and s v ϭ rate mean and standard deviation; T 0 ϭ minimum nondecision time; s t ϭ nondecision time range and s ϭ diffusion coefficient. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
agreement with all earlier analyses except the finding of an effect of PM on rate standard deviation for the AIC-LBA model in our Experiment 2. Consistent with previous findings, model selection evidence for an effect of PM on nondecision time was equivocal: For both models AIC included an effect but BIC rejected it. AIC and BIC supported PM effects on threshold and response bias parameters in both models. Figures 10 and 11 show the fit of the AIC-selected RD and LBA models (i.e., the models with no PM effects on rate parameters). Both models provide a similar level of fit, which captures major trends in the data but is somewhat poorer than fits to our data, likely due to very low error rates and smaller numbers of observations per participant. The top models, which allowed for PM effects on rates, did not noticeably improve the quality of fits in these graphs (see supplementary materials, Section D), and the reduction in fit for the AIC model was not significant for the LBA, 2 (909) ϭ 886, p ϭ .82, or for the RD, 2 (707) ϭ 725, p ϭ .31, models.
Importantly, the AIC-selected models capture the complicated pattern of effects on PM cost of the interaction between items types (words vs. nonwords) and instructions (specific vs. nonspecific). Similarly to results reported previously for correct response mean RT, median RT for correct responses (given by the middle lines in the middle column of panels in Figures 10 and 11) showed a pattern of PM cost consistent with mediation by response bias. PM cost (i.e., PM subtracted from control block median RT) with nonspecific instructions was 0.06 s and 0.02 s for words and nonwords respectively. For specific instructions it was 0.09 s Note. PM ϭ prospective memory vs. control block factor and S ϭ stimulus factor (nonword, low frequency word, high frequency word). Fit is quantified by: D ϭ deviance (measure of misfit, necessarily smaller for the most complex top model); AIC ϭ Akaike Information Criterion; BIC ϭ Bayesian Information Criterion (in both cases smaller is better); p ϭ number of model parameters per subject. Parameters: A ϭ maximum start-point noise; B ϭ threshold to A; v and s v ϭ rate mean and standard deviation; T Er ϭ nondecision time. Figure 10 . AIC-selected RD model fits to Lourenço et al. (2013) error rates (left column), RT distribution for correct responses (10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles, middle column) and the 50th percentile (median) for error responses (right column). Top row: specific group results. Bottom row: PM nonspecific-group results. Data are plotted accompanied by within-subject error bars calculated using Morey's (2008) Mediation via response bias was evident in analyses of the AIC-selected model's parameters. For the RD model response bias, as quantified by z/a, was more strongly in favor of words in the control block (0.57) than the PM block (0.51), F(1, 72) ϭ 10.6, p ϭ .002. Although the corresponding interaction did not achieve significance, there was a trend for the effect to be stronger under specific (0.6 vs. 0.52) than nonspecific (0.56 vs. 0.5) instructions. Consistent with a zero-sum effect, estimates of the RD response threshold (a) parameter were almost identical in control and PM blocks (0.232 vs. 0.229, respectively) . In other words, the increase in threshold for words for the PM block compared with control blocks was cancelled out by the decrease in threshold for nonwords for PM block compared with control blocks. So, overall, there was no main effect of block type (PM vs. control) on threshold. Variability in starting points (s z 
Discussion
Our analysis of Lourenço et al. (2013) confirms that the major effect of PM demands is on thresholds, although this was expressed in terms of response bias (i.e., in the case of the LBA a difference in thresholds between accumulators) rather than the overall threshold level as in our experiments. It also confirms the overall pattern of model fits to our own data regarding PM effects on ongoing task performance: strong threshold effects, weaker evidence for an increase in nondecision time, and a minimal effect Figure 11 . AIC-selected LBA model fits to Lourenço et al. (2013) error rates (left column), RT distribution for correct responses (10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles, middle column) and the 50th percentile (median) for error responses (right column). Top row: specific group results. Bottom row: PM nonspecific-group results. Data are plotted accompanied by within-subject error bars calculated using Morey's (2008) bias-corrected method. PM ϭ prospective memory; RT ϭ reaction time; AIC ϭ Akaike Information Criterion; LBA ϭ linear ballistic accumulator. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
on rates. The only exception to this pattern-a PM effect on rate variability in Experiment 2-was not replicated in Lourenço et al.'s experiment, even though the Lourenço et al. design was very similar to our design in Experiment 2. One reason for this lack of replication may be the smaller cost in the Lourenço et al. experiment compared to our Experiment 2. Nonetheless, given this lack of replication, and also uncertainty about why capacitysharing PM theories would predict an effect on rate variability without an effect on mean rates, this finding from Experiment 2 and any support it provides for capacity-sharing PM theories must be treated as tentative. Given that the same pattern (strong threshold effects, weaker evidence for an increase in nondecision time, and a minimal effect on rates) was found in every within-subjects PM design we examined, it suggests that a lack of significant PM effects in our reanalysis of Smith (2003) and Boywitt and Rummel (2012) was due to their use of a between-subjects PM design along with the presence of substantial nuisance effects. However, it is important to reiterate that this pattern is unlikely to be design specific, as counterbalancing in our data allowed us to confirm that the same pattern of effects was present in purely between-subjects analyses.
The analysis of Lourenço et al. (2013) adds to our previous results by showing that response threshold can mediate PM costs in a response-specific way, that is, by changing response bias. In Lourenço et al.'s data the adjustment in bias occurred without any change in the overall level of response threshold, as participants appeared to trade a requirement for more word evidence with a requirement for lower nonword evidence. This tradeoff is not a necessary prediction of the delay theory, which predicts that PM accuracy depends only on the word threshold. However, it does show that participants were not just increasing threshold in a nonspecific way, but rather differentiated between responses for which increased threshold was beneficial and those for which it was not. This differentiation is consistent with a strategic process that not only improves PM accuracy, but also improves response speed in cases where that does not compromise PM performance. The strategic nature of the adjustment was also consistent with the trend found for the bias adjustment to be larger when participants were made aware of the association between words and PM targets than when they were told there was no association. In contrast, it is hard to see why an instruction manipulation would make any difference to PM cost if it were due to a fundamental capacity limitation that presumably is not amenable to alternation by strategic factors.
The strategic bias explanation differs markedly from Lourenço et al. 's (2013) explanation of trial-by-trial changes in task interference. First, it does not require identification on each trial of the stimulus type. Further, it does not require any type of trial-to-trial adjustment. Given that stimuli change unpredictably from trial to trial a stimulus-based explanation seems to require the stimulus to be identified as a word or nonword at some level before the ongoing task response. This explanation might be seen as somewhat circular, as identification-dependent interference would then have to somehow interfere with the overt identification process. It is possible that overt identification is somehow separate from, and slower than, the identification modulating interference, but at the very least this is a rather complex explanation in need of further testing.
Our response-bias explanation, in contrast, is much simpler as it does not require identification or trial-by-trial changes. Instead, participants need only become aware of the association between stimulus-type and PM targets and adjust their response bias accordingly. Once set, this bias can then remain constant over remaining trials. That said, it remains possible that participants do make trial-by-trial changes in bias, and certainly in the nonspecific condition there must have been some initial process that learned to adjust bias, as participants were not instructed on the association between words and PM targets. However, such changes can be made after overt identification and do not require a separate fast identification process. Further, strategic adjustment of thresholds contingent on past responses is a well-established process supported by a rich history of evidence in choice tasks (Treisman & Williams, 1984) , as well as more recent evidence that criteria can be adjusted quite quickly over the course of a few trials (Brown, Steyvers, & Hemmer, 2007) and in apparently sophisticated ways through quite simple adaptive algorithms (Turner, Van Zandt, & Brown, 2011) .
General Discussion
We investigated event-based prospective memory (PM: remembering to remember to make a response contingent on the occurrence of a target presented in a concurrent ongoing task) in five data sets coming from two new experiments and three experiments reported elsewhere (Boywitt & Rummel, 2012; Horn et al., 2011; Lourenço et al., 2013) . Contingent on the occurrence of PM targets (i.e., a stimulus of a particular color or containing a particular string of letters) in ongoing tasks (lexical decision or color matching), participants were required to make a PM response, in most cases instead of the ongoing task response but in one case afterward. In all cases PM demands produced PM costs in the form of slower ongoing task response time (RT) relative to a control conditions with no PM demands. These costs varied from as little as 0.03 s to as much as almost 0.15 s.
We used two different evidence accumulation theories of choice RT-the Ratcliff diffusion (RD, Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 2002) and the linear ballistic accumulator (LBA, Brown & Heathcote, 2008) -to model performance in an ongoing task. For each model type we fit and compared a large number of model variants that differed in which experimental manipulations were allowed to affect which model parameters. We aimed to identify configurations that provided a comprehensive, accurate, coherent, and parsimonious account of the effects on all experimental manipulations on both choice accuracy and choice RT. We also used a variety of methods to adjudicate model performance, ranging from graphical assessments of fit and significance tests on model fits and parameter estimates to formal information criteria (BIC and AIC) that strike a balance between goodness-of-fit and parsimony based on different theoretical frameworks (Burnham & Anderson, 2004) . Our motivation in applying a plethora of models and methods was to reduce the reliance of our conclusions on the assumptions of any one approach. In doing so, we sought to identify the parameters associated with PM costs that were robust across models and to estimate the contribution of each to the cost.
Our reanalysis of two data sets previously subject to a significantly more limited model-based analysis (Boywitt & Rum- This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
mel, 2012; Horn et al., 2011) revealed that they were not sufficient to support any clear conclusions when subject to our requirement to provide a comprehensive and accurate account including response bias, stimulus type, practice, and item repetition effects neglected in the earlier analyses. In contrast, the designs and sample sizes used in our two experiments, and that of Lourenço et al. (2013) , were sufficient to support clear conclusions. Despite the potential for contradiction given the many different methods we employed and their diverse assumptions, our findings displayed a remarkable unanimity. By all approaches it was clear that the majority of PM cost was due to increased response threshold. That is, under PM demands there was an increase in the threshold amount of evidence required to select a response in the ongoing task. For the LBA model this was the sole cause of PM cost in all but one data set. In that data set there was also an effect of PM demand on variability in the rate that evidence accumulated, but it accounted for a much smaller part of the PM cost than the response threshold effect. For the RD model a small component of cost was attributed nondecision time (the time to encode the ongoing task stimulus and to produce a response), and this attribution was consistent across data sets. In the following we discuss the implications of these findings for the delay account, and capacity-sharing accounts, of PM costs. We then address future directions for the study of costs and PM.
The Delay Account showed that requiring participants to delay their ongoing task response caused an increase in PM accuracy (i.e., the probability with which participants identified and correctly responded to PM targets). Their interpretation of this finding was in terms of a race between processes identifying the required ongoing task response and PM response, with the exogenously imposed delay allowing PM identification to avoid losing the race and being preempted by the ongoing task response. Our results support the delay theory account of PM costs by showing that costs were the result of increased evidence accumulation (elevated thresholds), not to the division of limited processing resources. This finding in turn is consistent with the idea that participants adopt a cautious strategy in PM blocks, that is, an endogenously mediated delay in order to achieve the same end as the exogenously imposed delay of Loft and Remington. We found strong evidence for this in Experiments 1 and 2 and also found strong evidence for increased PM stimulus specific thresholds when PM responses succeeded rather than replaced ongoing task responses in the Lourenço et al. (2013) data. In this case slowing could be beneficial if the ongoing task response-production process, as distinct from the ongoing task response-selection process, interrupted or interfered with detecting a PM target.
Thus far, we have assumed, like virtually every account of PM costs, that costs to the ongoing task RT reflect strategies to improve target detection. In PAM or MPV, for example, they arise from the need to divert processing resources to the PM task, whereas in our delay theory they arise from elevated thresholds reflecting a cautious response selection strategy. The fact that costs have sometimes found to be positively correlated with PM accuracy provides some indirect support for the notion that costs are indeed functional (e.g., Loft & Yeo, 2007; Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004) . Nonetheless, an alternate interpretation of the threshold effects we observed is that PM costs are nonstrategic, reflecting only that participants respond more cautiously because they perceive PM demands as increasing task difficulty. This nonstrategic account is not supported by our observation that the threshold increase was limited to responses that are most associated with PM targets. This finding was most marked in Lourenço et al. 's (2013) data, where only stimuli associated with one of the two possible responses could contain PM targets. It was also particularly the case if participants were warned beforehand that only words carried PM targets, although they were still able to detect this contingency and adjust thresholds even when not warned. Not only did participants have a higher threshold for the PM-associated response, they also took advantage of the fact that PM targets did not occur in the other stimulus type by lowering their response threshold. This is a strategic and functional adaptation, as it allowed participants to achieve faster responding without risking PM errors.
We found increases in the nondecision time parameter in the RD models that accounted for a minority of the PM costs. In general, while not predicted by delay theory, the effects pose no direct challenge to the delay theory, and are consistent with the notion that PM costs reflect functional adaptations to support PM performance. The nondecision time parameter includes the time to encode stimuli and the time to produce an ongoing task response after the response has been selected. In either case the associated delay could decrease the probability that a PM response is preempted. Increased encoding time might also increase the probability of encoding aspects of the stimulus relevant to detecting the PM target, and increased production time might decrease the chance of ongoing task responding interfering with PM processes. However, it important to emphasize that longer decision time under PM demands was model dependent, occurring consistently in fits of the RD model but not in fits of the LBA model. This stands in stark contrast to the very large effect of PM on threshold, which was in evidence across all models, indicating that increased thresholds under PM demands were not model dependent. This divergence of conclusions clearly illustrates the utility of not relying entirely on one type of evidence accumulation model.
As previously discussed, found that spurious changes in nondecision time could occur in fits of the RD model to a simulated LBA threshold change. This suggests a potential explanation of the divergence between models in inferences about nondecision time, that the data were generated by an LBA threshold effect and fits of the RD model spuriously mimicked this with a nondecision time effect. Consistent with this possibility, the LBA provided a clearly superior account of our two experiments, both descriptively and in terms of AIC and BIC model selection. However, the RD account was superior on the same grounds for Lourenço et al. 's (2013) data. Clearly more work, likely requiring experiments attempting to directly manipulate potential nondecision time effects, will be required to resolve this issue.
The Capacity-Sharing Account
Contrary to findings reported by Horn et al. (2011) and Boywitt and Rummel (2012) we found little support for an effect of PM This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
demands on the rate of evidence accumulation in the ongoing task. We interpreted this finding as a failure to support the central tenant of all current PM theories that PM costs occur because the ongoing task and PM task share limited-capacity resources, such that PM demands reduce the capacity available to the perform the ongoing task. For example, PAM theory claims that capacity-consuming "preparatory attentional processes" combine with retrospective memory processes to discriminate target events from nontarget events and to recollect intended actions (Smith, 2003; Smith et al., 2007) . The multiprocess view of PM claims cognitive capacity is required to "monitor" for nonfocal targets . Similarly, Guynn's (2003) theory of strategic monitoring claims that capacity is required to maintain PM intentions in an active state and periodically to check for target events. It is important to note that we are not denying the possibility that capacity-demanding PM control processes are used by individuals with PM demands; we did not test this premise. Instead, the crucial point we are making is that we found very little support for the core and explicit assumption of all current PM theories that these PM processes draw resources away from ongoing task processing (i.e., that there is capacity sharing). Following Horn et al. (2011) and Boywitt and Rummel (2012) we operationalized capacity as the rate of evidence accumulation in the RD model of the ongoing task. In order to encompass capacity effects in a broad way we generalized this definition to any rate-related parameters of both the RD and LBA models. This included the mean rate and the standard deviation of rates over trials for both the RD and LBA models, and moment-to-moment variability in the rate for the RD model. Underlining the breadth of our definition, it is first time to our knowledge that the latter parameter has been estimated rather than fixed to the same value for all conditions (see Donkin et al., 2009) .
For both RD and LBA models, and in all but one data set-the new experiment we reported with the largest PM cost-we found no support for an effect of PM demands on rate parameters. Allowing an effect of PM on rates produced negligible improvements in model fit and was rejected in the vast majority of cases by all of our statistical criteria. One might object that we cannot claim that there was absolutely no rate effect, although this conclusion was supported by model-selection methods that are able to support a null hypothesis by taking into account both fit and model complexity (see Pitt & Myung, 2002) . However, and more importantly, we believe this objection would miss the main point; that the relative magnitude of capacity effects, which are the principal explanatory constructs in current PM theory, is tiny in comparison to the strong and consistent effects we found on evidence thresholds, in keeping with delay theory.
The only case in which we found support for an effect on a rate-related parameter was in our second experiment, where the LBA trial-to-trial variability parameter was greater under PM demands. There are several reasons to qualify the support this case provides for capacity-sharing theories. First, we did not replicate the effect in our analysis of Lourenço et al.'s (2013) data, even though they used the same ongoing and PM tasks. The main differences between these studies were that the ongoing task was harder and the PM cost larger (0.15 s) than in our Experiment 2, although the cost was still quite substantial for word stimuli in Lourenço et al. (0.08 s and 0.13 s, respectively, in their nonspecific and specific conditions). Second, the effect on rate variability had little effect on PM cost as it is conventionally measured, by correct response RT, although it did have a larger effect on error RT. Third, it is unclear why a capacity-sharing effect would manifest only in rate variability. It may be that PM demands make it more difficult to allocate attention to the ongoing task in a consistent manner. However, as there was no effect on the mean rate, there must be trials where extra capacity is available as well as trials where less capacity is available. The availability of extra capacity, even if only on some trials, is inconsistent with the general notion that PM demands consume some part of a fixed and limited pool of attention. Rather, this finding suggests that there may be effects on the size of the overall pool, with PM demands sometimes facilitating attention.
Overall, therefore, evidence for PM effects on capacity as operationalized by the rate of evidence accumulation is tenuous, or at best provisional and in need of further investigation. The nondecision time effects we observed could support capacity-based accounts if, as we suggested, PM demands reduce capacity necessary to encode stimulus aspects or even response production relevant to the ongoing task. As noted earlier however, encoding and response production are widely thought not to rely on shared limited-capacity resources, and thus be unaffected by the division of such resources (see, e.g., Pashler, 1994) . However, as it stands, our evidence related to nondecision time, although stronger than that associated with rates, is much weaker than that associated with threshold effects, and able to at best explain a modest component of PM costs. Further, the nondecision time effect is arguably consistent with not only the checking and capacity-sharing theory but also the delay theory account, and so it is theoretically ambiguous. In summary, this quite modest contribution of nondecision time, which is not necessarily due to capacity-sharing, stands in stark contrast to the effects of response threshold, which are stronger, present in all models and, as described further below, can be undeniably linked to delay theory.
Threshold effects cannot be related to a delay due to PM checking, as they are purely associated with ongoing task processing. Similarly, to ascribe elevated thresholds to a capacity effect would make the concept of capacity so broad as to be of questionable utility. Thresholds are conceived of as an aspect of decision processing that is under flexible strategic control (e.g., Mulder et al., 2012; Wagenmakers et al., 2008) . They are also assumed to be fixed during the course of a trial, with any adjustments occurring prior to stimulus presentation and/or after responding. Delay theory provides a natural account of the threshold effects in terms of the conventional view that they are strategically set to manage the trade-off between speed and accuracy (for a review see Ratcliff & Smith, 2004) . The strategic nature of threshold setting was most evident for Lourenço et al.'s (2013) data, where it manifested as an adjustment in response bias that could serve not only to improve PM accuracy but also to increase ongoing task speed where that could not conflict with PM demands.
We believe our findings indicate the need for a fundamental reevaluation of current theories of PM costs. It is possible that there is no need to posit capacity-sharing processes to account for PM costs in many event-based PM paradigms. Instead, PM costs could result from threshold changes that are largely assumed to operate outside attentional limits, and not to compete for limitedcapacity resources. This conclusion is, of course, only reliable to the extent that our modeling assumptions are correct. Further, some of our arguments hinge on addressing aspects of behavior, This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
such as practice effects and response bias, not captured by previous models, but future models explaining aspects of behavior (e.g., PM responses) or other (e.g., neural) measurements, not addressed by our model have the potential to alter conclusions yet again. Even if this is not the case, an objection to our conclusions might be that evidence accumulation models cannot provide valid or complete operationalization of capacity. As our models provide a quite comprehensive account of behavior in the ongoing task a lack of completeness is difficult to sustain as long as effects on all parameters are considered, which we have done. Converging evidence also supports validity, particularly for accumulator models, which allow for two senses of capacity, overall rates and the difference between rates for accumulators corresponding to correct and incorrect responses. As outlined earlier, Eidels et al. (2010) showed that capacity characterized by LBA rate parameters agreed with the rigorous and widely applied nonparametric capacity estimates provided by Systems Factorial Technology (Townsend & Altieri, 2012; Townsend & Nozawa, 1995) , and Logan et al. (2014) also used accumulation rates to test the idea of capacity sharing in the stop-signal paradigm in relation to capacity shared by stop and choice processes.
We chose to model behavior in paradigms representative of the sorts of experiments that have provided the vast majority of the evidence supporting PM theories. In these PM paradigms-including a case in which PM cost was on the high end of previously reported costs-support for the capacity sharing account was weak. Even though PM processes appeared to share negligible capacity with ongoing processes, PM accuracy ranged between approximately 50% and 70%. Hence, it appears that far from negligible PM accuracy can be obtained with little or no imposition on the capacity used by an ongoing task. However, it remains possible that in some circumstances PM and ongoing processes will share capacity in a way that is reflected in evidence accumulation rates. One such circumstance is safety-critical work settings where PM errors are catastrophic and so the PM task potentially becomes the primary focus (Dismukes, 2012; Loft, 2014 ). An important avenue for future work is to examine circumstances more equivalent to safety-critical settings with higher PM accuracy. This could be simulated in the laboratory by strongly emphasizing the importance of the PM task relative to the ongoing task (Loft & Yeo, 2007; Smith & Bayen, 2004) . A second circumstance where PM demands may impact rates is where targets are perceptually nonfocal to ongoing task demands (e.g., . However, we do not view these possibilities as weakening the impact of our delay theory and associated claims in the current paper. It is likely that the continued application of evidence accumulation modeling to a wide range of PM tasks will reveal patterns that were heretofore hidden. It will be interesting to examine if there are patterns that emerge between studies showing drift rate changes and those that will not that will deepen our understanding not only of PM but also of the tasks we use to study it.
Current Scope and Future Directions
The delay theory account differs markedly from previous theorizing about how performance in the Einstein-McDaniel paradigm relates to underlying psychological mechanisms and their role in elevating ongoing-task RT. Our model embodies the assumption that a single process is responsible for both cases where PM costs appear (such as with nonfocal PM tasks), indicating that participants have increased the ongoing-task threshold, and cases where PM costs do not appear, in which case we assume that thresholds were not changed. At a more general level, delay theory builds on the architecture of evidence accumulation models in which behavior is decomposed into a set of interacting processes. As we model more and more data sets it will be possible to learn which conditions affect this uniform mechanism. In contrast, the multiprocess view of PM proposes two sets of mechanisms underlying PM costs; a spontaneous retrieval component to account for cases where there are no PM costs in RT and a completely different "monitoring" mechanism invoked when there are costs.
However, it is appropriate to reiterate at this point what our delay theory and model does and does not contribute to an explanation of PM costs. Although our model quantitatively fitted all aspects of the ongoing-task data, and in so doing clarified which psychological process underlie the PM costs, it could be argued that delay theory has little predictive value. That is, the model cannot anticipate what factors (environmental, experiential, instructional, stimulus) will likely lead to costs. We agree, and such a criticism could be leveled at evidence accumulation models in general. This point notwithstanding, our model has value because it provides coherence to an otherwise scattered set of theoretical interpretations of PM costs, and in doing so makes a case that all existing interpretations of PM costs must be reexamined. Also, a growing body of work has examined the effects of numerous experimental manipulations on model parameters, which should prove to be a valuable source for empirical predictions. For example, in this article we predicted that word frequency would affect drift rates based on previous work. Not only can past work allow empirical generalizations, but it also plays in important role in model validation.
It is also important to be clear that we have presented a theory and model of ongoing-task performance, and not of PM performance. Delay theory provides an alternative interpretation of the influential Einstein-McDaniel paradigm, and, by drawing on evidence accumulation models, led to new insights into the nature of PM costs. To the extent that PM costs have had implications for the PM processes specified by current PM theory, our results will encourage a reexamination of those assumed PM processes. In its present state, however, our model does not posit the specific mechanisms responsible for PM performance. As a result, there are many phenomena regarding PM accuracy that fall outside delay theory and the quantitative models presented here. These include, but are not limited to, the effects of the degree of association between targets and PM actions , target focality , the number of encoded targets (Marsh et al., 2003) , and target-nontarget distinctiveness (Smith & Bayen, 2004) on PM accuracy. However, in principle these PM phenomena are not inconsistent with the basic idea of delay theory or evidence accumulation models.
Indeed, we have ongoing efforts to extend the model in these directions and to provide coverage of PM responses. Consistent with , our models point toward a mental architecture in which both ongoing task processes and PM task processes race in parallel. That is, accumulators for ongoing task choices and the PM response participate in an independent "horse-race." This horserace architecture, which is used by the LBA and other accumulator models, has also been successfully used to model the stop-signal task (e.g., Logan & Cowan, 1984; Logan et al., 2014) . The stop-signal and PM task share the feature that an infrequent response to a target must compete for response section with a more frequent response. In the PM task, slowing the ongoing task runners by increasing ongoing task This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
response thresholds increases the chance that the PM runner wins the race. Note, however, that if more evidence is also required for the PM response, increasing ongoing task thresholds may not reduce the probability of the ongoing task winning the race. That is, overall slowing of ongoing task responses does not improve PM performance; rather PM improvement requires slowing of ongoing responses relative to PM responses. It is also likely that rates for both the ongoing task and PM task can be slowed by the addition of demanding additional secondary task (e.g., Marsh & Hicks, 1998; Harrison et al., 2014) , or variations in individuals working memory capacity (Brewer et al., 2010; Smith, 2010; Smith & Bayen, 2005) . Depending on the relative rate of slowing of the rate of evidence accumulation for the ongoing and PM tasks, this could lead to increased nonfocal (Marsh & Hicks, 1998) or focal (Harrison et al., 2014 ) PM error.
Our results are consistent with thresholds being increased strategically, offering a possible explanation for cases of little or no PM costs. It is likely, for example, that evidence for focal or salient PM targets will accumulate faster than for other types of targets. If the PM task response is not at a disadvantage in reaching threshold before the ongoing task, then the ongoing-task threshold might be left alone and PM retrieval can reliably occur without cost to ongoing tasks. Regardless of the presence or absence of threshold changes and associated cost, if the PM and ongoing task runners do not interact during the race and the presence of the PM runner does not change the evidence driving the ongoing-task runners then the race can be described as an unlimited-capacity independent process (Townsend & Nozawa, 1995) . Race architectures have the virtue that they provide a mathematically tractable means of constructing detailed process models of complicated choices, allowing for both unlimited capacity and capacity limits in the form rate changes (Eidels et al., 2010 ) that might be induced by PM demands. Given the many different ways in which capacity has been defined and used (see Townsend & Eidels, 2011) , and the attendant risk of a lack of clear and testable predictions, this represents a substantial advance on the largely nonquantitative approach to capacity limits that has characterized the PM literature.
Given the tractability and apparent suitability of race architectures, we believe an important future direction for PM theories is to move beyond detailed process modeling of only the ongoing task, as exemplified by the use by us and others of evidence accumulation models, toward a unified model of all aspects of PM tasks including the frequency of correct PM responses, PM misses, and PM false alarms and their attendant RT distributions. Racing evidence accumulation models are promising for this purpose because they naturally accommodate the fact that PM errors are so pervasive and difficult to eradicate. Marked variability in the time to accrue a threshold amount of evidence, which is strongly supported by the pervasive observation that choice RT is highly variable, means that errors are hard to entirely eradiate in these models. In contrast, traditional PM theories must invoke extra an extra factor, capacity limitations, that are apparently so severe that they cause special purpose monitoring mechanisms to often be completely ineffective.
However, attempts to develop race models have revealed challenges with traditional paradigms where PM trials are so rare that the data are insufficient to constrain estimates of the PM evidenceaccumulation process. This rarity of PM trials also resulted in very low power when assessing correlations between model parameters and indices of PM performance such as PM accuracy. 3 Hence, this new direction will likely require empirical research exploring the effects of making PM responses more common, or by keeping the nontarget to target ratio the same as previous research but presenting participants substantially more experimental trials. A second challenge relates to response-key arrangements, which typically involve participants resting their fingers on the ongoing-task keys but having to make a larger movement for the PM response. 4 Having all response keys equally easy to press will facilitate race-model fitting by equating nondecision time across responses, especially as neglecting unequal nondecision times between responses can lead to biased estimates of other model parameters (Voss, Voss, & Klauer, 2010) .
The promise of these new empirical and theoretical directions is that they can potentially provide direct and powerful tests of the relationships between PM performance and latent theoretical constructs, such as capacity and response thresholds. For example, the several studies that have manipulated the importance of the PM task relative to the ongoing task Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2001 Loft & Humphreys, 2012; Loft, Kearney et al., 2008; Loft & Yeo, 2007) have reported increased PM hit rates, but have either not reported the PM false alarm rate-likely because they were rare-or found no corresponding increase in PM false alarm rates. Further research with increased PM frequency will be required to better measure this apparent lack of trade-off between hits and false alarms. It will also provide a strong test of the ability of a race model to provide an account beyond PM costs to PM performance itself. 3 In our second experiment, consistent with an increase in PM accuracy caused by the threshold increase we observed that when the PM block was first, we did find that PM accuracy was greater when the PM block was first (57%) than second (43%), F(2, 92) ϭ 3.5, p ϭ .03. However, block order did not have a significant effect on PM accuracy in our first experiment (F Ͻ 1) and, when we recalculated PM accuracy also scoring correct occasions where the participant made a PM response on the trial that followed the target trial (e.g., , the opposite trend was evident; higher accuracy when the PM block was second (63%) compared with first (50%), F(1, 45) ϭ 3.90, p ϭ .054. In our second experiment virtually no late PM responses occurred. 4 For example, Boywitt and Rummel (2012) used "J" and "N" keys for match and mismatch respectively, and the "1" key for the PM response. Smith (2003) used the "Y" and "N" keys for words and nonwords, and the "F1" key for PM, respectively. Our experiments also used the "F1" key for PM and the "F" and "J" keys for words and nonwords, respectively. Lourenço et al. (2013) used "J," "F" and "F6" keys, respectively, for word and nonword and PM responses. As pointed out by a reviewer, even if one were not concerned with modeling PM responses, differences in nondecision time between ongoing responses might be caused if the finger used for the ongoing response was consistently used for the PM response and participants positioned that finger to the side the ongoing task key nearest the PM key, or if they configured their wrist in preparation for a large movement to the PM key.
